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I. INTRODUCTION
The copyright clause provides that "[the Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science. . . by securing for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . .
writings . . . ."I The first amendment provides that "Congress
shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .
"..."2
Three modern developments portend a conflict between these
two clauses of the Constitution: (1) the emergence of the doctrine
that free speech encompasses the right to have access to, as well as
the right to disseminate, ideas; (2) the elimination of the requirement of publication, which historically ensured the right of access,
as a condition for statutory copyright;4 and (3) the codification of
the fair use doctrine, traditionally relied on to avoid conflict between copyright and free speech, 5 in a way that inhibits the right
of consumer access to copyrighted material.
The felt need to accommodate copyright to new communications technology caused Congress in the 1976 Copyright Acte to
eliminate publication as the quid pro quo for copyright.7 The new
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright clause is also the patent clause. Here I
give the clause a distributive reading. The entire clause reads: "The Congress shall have
Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. "Our precedents have focused 'not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.'" Board of Education v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); see also Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("the protection
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both").
4. Statutory copyright now subsists from the moment the work is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, every
copyright statute in this country, with one minor exception, 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) (the 1909
Act), required publication as a condition for statutory copyright. See Copyright Enactments, Laws Passed in the United States Since 1783 Relating to Copyright, C.O. BULL. No.
3 (Revised) (1973) [hereinafter Copyright Enactments].
5. See, e.g., Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1980).
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-809 (1982).
7. Although television gave the initial impetus for change, the problem now extends to
electronic communications technology generally, of which computers are the primary exam-e. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
, OPYRIGHTED WORKS, JULY 31, 1978 (1979) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION,

(Apr. 1986) [hereinafter OTA

REPORT].
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statute thereby created problems of access not present with the
paradigm of statutory copyright-printed material that is published.' A part of the pattern that emerged in the 1976 Act was a
codified fair use doctrine, 9 which presumably had become necessary for the partial fulfillment of the constitutional purpose of
copyright-the promotion of learning-because of the elimination
of publication, the traditional means of ensuring access (a sine qua
non of learning), as a condition of copyright. If indeed the codified
fair use doctrine was intended to promote access, however, it has
fallen far short of its mark. For fair use as codified has served to
enlarge the copyright monopoly by giving copyright owners a basis
for increasing their control of access to copyrighted works. And if,
as modern doctrine tells us, the right of free speech encompasses
the right to hear as well as to speak, to read as well as to publish, it
is obvious that Congress made these fundamental changes in copyright law with little regard for their effect on free speech rights.
The wisdom of the Constitution's framers in making the copyright
clause a limitation on, as well as a grant of, congressional power
was ignored, and the long latent conflict between copyright and
free speech rights has emerged to become a reality.
The notion that there is a conflict between two provisions of
the Constitution-the copyright and free speech clauses-is an
anathema to the judicial mind. Consequently, courts have consistently and almost without exception rejected the free speech defense in copyright infringement actions. 10 Equally unacceptable to
8.
As more and more works are transmitted electronically, .. public access to information, originally built into the copyright system, may in fact become more limited. Not
only may the individual price of information be higher; now people may have to pay for
it every time they wish to use it.
When printing was the dominant technology, this was not the case ....
With the electronic distribution of works, however, proprietors have more control
... . [T]heir works need not be sold in hard copies, and because it is questionable
whether individuals can legally copy them, they do not have to compete with resellers,
wholesalers, or others who might drive down the price of their products. As the only
source of distribution, people must come to the copyright holder on his own terms.
Now controlling access to their works, copyright holders can restrict it in order to enhance their profits. If they were to do this, copyright law would no longer perform the
function it was designed for under the Constitution.
OTA REPORT, supra note 7, at 8. The law has reached the point that Professor Benjamin
Kaplan warned of in 1966: "Copyright protection could thus ultimately meet the same constitutional objections as other attempted restraints on expression." B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 n.115 (1967).
9. See U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prod. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d

4
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the courts is the notion that the first amendment creates an exception to statutory copyright.11 Courts are correct on the latter point.
They err, however, by assuming that the first amendment is the
sole source of free speech rights and by ignoring the free speech
values in the copyright clause. My thesis is that the copyright
clause limits the power of Congress to grant copyright because it
embodies free speech constraints.12 The failure of lawmakers, legis1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977); Wainwright Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Triangle Publications,626 F.2d at 1171. Cf.
Rosemount Enter. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966) (Lumbard, J., concurring), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967)("The spirit of the First Amendment applies to the
copyright laws at least to the extent that the courts should not tolerate any attempted interference with the public's right to be informed regarding matters of general interest when
anyone seeks to use the copyright statute which was designed to protect the interests of
quite a different nature.").
11. The confusion in analysis that results from this approach is indicated by the following passage:
The First Amendment exception. . . appears to rest on a theory that while the grant
of copyright protection itself is constitutional, it is still only a statutory right which
may be superceded by a constitutional right. Once it is decided, however, that the First
Amendment operates in the copyright arena, it should be realized that it is a two-way
street, for the copyright owner also has First Amendment rights. Indeed, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has already held that copyright
owners do have a First Amendment right to remain silent.
W. PARRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 469-70 (1985).
A first amendment right to be silent, however, is irrelevant to copyright. Neither the
copyright clause nor the copyright statute requires an author to publish or disseminate his
works. The issue arises when the author, or copyright owner, has made the work public.
Thus, a free speech problem arises when the copyright owner makes the work public,
secures his reward, and then denies any right of further public access, for example with a
television newscast. The issue here is not whether this activity infringes free speech rights
under the first amendment, but whether it conflicts with the constitutional purpose of copyright-the promotion of learning. If the promotion of learning is not protected by free
speech rights, those rights have little meaning. Furthermore, a copyright that authorizes a
copyright owner to control the use of the copyrighted work for purposes of learning, as
opposed to profit, is contrary to the copyright clause. In Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan,
744 F,2d 1490, 1499 n.14 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1867 (1985), the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "Where the First Amendment removes obstacles to the free
flow of ideas, copyright law adds positive incentives to encourage the flow." This facile
statement misses the point. If a copyright gives the copyright owner control of the "positive
incentives," it constitutes an obstacle to the free flow of ideas.
12. "[I]t should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the
engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas." Harper & Row
Publishers v. Nation Assoc., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (1985). This case's dictum, however, treats
the free speech aspect of copyright as applying only to the author because the first amendment gives a "'concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect."' Id. (quoting Estate of Hemingway
v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 778, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)).
"Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright, and the right of first publication
in particular, serve this countervailing First Amendment value." Id. This approach, how.
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lative and judicial, to recognize this limitation results in part from
the confused and confusing concept of copyright, a concept that
has both a proprietary and regulatory basis. While courts have
tended to view copyright as primarily proprietary in nature,"3 Congress has treated it as regulatory. 14
Copyright's basis as a proprietary concept is that it enables
one to protect his or her own creations. Its regulatory basis is that
when these creations constitute the expression of ideas presented
to the public, they become part of the stream of information whose
unimpeded flow is critical to a free society. The right to control
access to one's own expressions before publication does not engender free speech concerns, but publishers' control of access after
publication does. This explains why historically copyright was
deemed a monopoly to be strictly construed and to be shaped to
serve the public interest over that of the copyright owner. The
public interest to be served was reasonable access to the copyrighted work.
Despite the regulatory nature of copyright statutes, courts
tend to treat copyright as proprietary in nature, presumably because they are concerned with equity as between the litigants and
the equity is most often in favor of the copyright owner. The statutory limitations on copyright, however, enable courts to avoid the
fundamental issue of copyright law. That issue is whether copyright is a right of the author by reason of his creation or whether it
ever, means that the author has the right to control access to the copyrighted work, which is
the essence of censorship. Although the Court was speaking of an unpublished manuscript,
its dictum is not so limited. When applied to a form of electronic communication, such as
television, to which only limited access is provided in the first place, the harm this reasoning
can do to the first amendment right of access is apparent.
13. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). In Mazer the Supreme Court held
that works of art incorporated into a design of useful articles are copyrightable. In enacting
the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress rejected provisions to create "a form of copyright protection for 'original' designs which are clearly a part of the useful article" because of concern
that such a copyright "would create a new monopoly which has not been justified by showing that its benefits will outweigh the disadvantage of removing such designs from free public use." H.R. RaP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5659, 5663.
14. Congress made this point in the House Report accompanying the bill that eventually became the Copyright Act of 1909. In considering its power to enact a compulsory
license for recording musical compositions, Congress reported: "The enactment of copyright
legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural
right that the author has in his writings, . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted ... not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public ... ." H.R.
REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
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is a right created and limited by statute for the public benefit. The
1976 Act has caused the issue to surface. The unresolved question
is whether copyright is essentially a proprietary or a regulatory
15
concept.
This Article's position is that copyright functions as a regulatory concept and should be recognized as such. In dealing with the
proper characterization of copyright, however, it is important to
distinguish between the work that is copyrighted and the copyright. The work is subject to a series of rights that taken together
comprise the copyright. To characterize copyright properly, therefore, one must look to the law of copyright and its purpose and
function. In other words, one must consider copyright's intended
goal and the means chosen to attain that goal.
The law of copyright can be viewed most usefully as statutory
unfair competition based on the misappropriation rationale.' 6 The
law's function is to protect the copyrighted work against predatory
competitive practices. Its purpose, however, is somewhat ambiguous. While copyright's constitutional purpose-the promotion of
learning-is clear, it is not clear whether this purpose is better
served by encouraging the creation or by encouraging the distribution of works. One's choice of the means by which copyright's constitutional purpose is attained is important, because that choice is
determined by, or determines, one's view of copyright as proprietary or regulatory in nature. If one chooses to attain this constitutional purpose by encouraging the creation of works, the proprietary view of copyright follows logically because people commonly
are deemed to own what they create. If, on the other hand, one
chooses to attain this purpose by encouraging distribution, the regulatory nature of copyright follows logically because distribution
requires regulation.
My argument is that copyright's constitutional purpose is best
15. In this regard, Professor Kaplan noted:
To say that copyright is 'property,' although a fundamentally unhistorical statement, would not be boldly misdescriptive if one were prepared to acknowledge that
there is property and property, with few if any legal consequences extending uniformly
to all species and that in practice the lively questions are likely to be whether certain
consequences ought to attach to a given piece of so-called property in given circumstances. . . . But characterization in grand terms then seems of little value: we may as
well go directly to the policies actuating or justifying the particular determinations.
KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 72.
16. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). While this case
has been limited to its facts and is thus viewed as a "sport," the application of copyright to
new technology has made the case's teachings relevant to modem conditions.
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served by encouraging the distribution of works. Learning requires
access to the work in which the ideas to be learned are embodied.
Because there can be no access without distribution, encouraging
distribution is vitally important. The fact that creation is also necessary to the learning process does not alter this conclusion for two
reasons. First, if copyright encourages creation, it does. so only for
the purpose of profit. Profit, however, cannot be obtained without
distribution. Second, in creating a work an author harvests his
ideas from the public domain. Copyright, which protects the ex1
pression of these ideas, is an encroachment on the public domain 7
and can be justified only if it provides the public with some form
of compensation. The public can be compensated most effectively
by making the author's efforts accessible. Copyright, therefore, can
be viewed as being in the nature of a bargain and sale. In return
for providing public access to his efforts, the author is given limited protection for a limited period of time. The proprietary view
of copyright, however, emphasizes the bargain and minimizes the
sale. Thus, the history of statutory copyright in this country
reveals that limitations on both the scope and duration of copyright protection have been continually enlarged. Yet, given the
function of copyright-protection of the distributed work against
predatory competition-it follows that the basic constitutional
purpose of copyright-promotion of learning-is best served by
encouraging distribution.1 8
This conclusion is contrary to the traditional view that the
constitutional purpose of copyright is best served by encouraging
the creation of works,1 9 but it is well supported by reason and history.20 First, creativity is not a process amenable to statutory in17. I am indebted to Professor David Lange for his insight that copyright law is an
encroachment on the public domain.
18. "The congressional role therefore-as is made very clear in the text of the Constitution-is to define the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted a creator in
order to give the public appropriate access to the creation." H.R. REP. 781, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1984).
19.
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
"Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219. See also Harper& Row Publishers, 105 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting the
above passage); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
20. There is a certain irony in the view that the Anglo-American copyright is an
author's right, designed to encourage creation. The idea can be traced to the Statute of
Anne, 8 ANNE, ch. 19, the English copyright act of 1710. For the first time in English history,
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centives21 Second, copyright did not come into existence until the
printing press facilitated the reproduction and widespread distribution of books. To protect the right to exclusive distribution,
publishers created copyright. From this protection the author who
created the work gained at best a reward secondary to that of the
publisher.22 Copyright, therefore, originally functioned to encourage not creation, but distribution. In this regard, copyright's
function is essentially the same today.28
The characterization of copyright as a form of monopoly obscures the primary purpose of copyright as encouraging distribution. The unique aspect of this "monopoly" is that the statute that
imposes the limitations also creates the rights, for "apart from its
recognition in law," copyright "has no existence of it own. '' 25 The
copyright owner naturally emphasizes the statutory rights and
deemphasizes the concomitant regulations. Because the accepted
justification for copyright is that it protects an author's creations,
the notion that copyright is essentially proprietary rather than regulatory in nature has an emotional appeal that overrides reason.
the statute enabled an author to obtain a copyright for his work. Prior to the statute, copyright was the stationers' copyright and was available only to members of the Stationers'
Company, the London Company of the booktrade. One of the conditions for obtaining a
copyright under the new statute was the creation of a new work. Because the author created
the work, statutory copyright was deemed to be an author's right. This historical analysis
overlooks the fact that the statute was a trade regulation act designed to destroy and prevent the recurrence of the booksellers' monopoly based on the old stationers' copyright. See
Patterson, The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 223 (1966).
The "new work" requirement was a means of insuring that works which went into the public
domain because of the new statutory copyright's limited term could not be recaptured by
the booksellers' copyright.
21. This fact may explain why the Supreme Court long ago downgraded creativity to
little more than the absence of copying. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S.
53 (1884) (photographs copyrightable); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880) ("novelty of
the art or thing described has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright").
22.
Historically, it was not authors who got the Statute of Anne, but publishers-the
London booksellers of those days. A publisher may own the copyright free and clear,
and take all the gross income; or he may pay royalties, and take most of the gross
income. Either way, he usually gets more from a copyrighted book then when he is
subject to open competition. Therefore, much of the tax that the Copyright Act imposes on readers goes directly to publishers.
Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 508 (1945).
23. "In essence, copyright is the right of an author to control the reproduction of his
intellectual creation." HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., lST SESs.. REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw

3 (Comm.

Print 1961).

24. "Copyright in any form, whether statutory or at common-law, is a monopoly. .
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940).
25. Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 147 (1981).
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Strictly speaking, it is copyright law, not copyright, that is regulatory. Characterizing copyright as property obscures copyright
law's regulatory nature because the unanalyzed assumption is that
property is protected by property law. Therefore, the importance
of whether one views copyright law as protecting property or regulating trade is twofold. First, to view copyright as protecting property is to subject its regulatory aspects to proprietary concepts and
thus to minimize, if not defeat, the goal of public access. Second,
viewing copyright as protecting property implies that copyright is a
unitary rather than complex concept.
To view modern copyright as a unitary concept is to ignore
reality. Copyright varies in its legal characteristics depending upon
the type of work that it protects and whose use it regulates. Although the 1976 Act defines the copyright owner's rights in one
section,26 it subjects those rights to limitations in twelve other sections.27 For example, the Act distinguishes between the copyright
of a musical composition and the copyright of a sound recording.
Moreover, the statute contains four compulsory licenses," and the
ultimate goal of copyright is that copyrighted works become part
of the public domain. Characterizing copyright as unitary and primarily proprietary in nature rather than complex and regulatory
thus assumes away issues of considerable importance: whether
compulsory licenses, for example, are not an unconstitutional exercise of power over private property or whether forcing works into
the public domain is not the unlawful taking of private property.
Nonetheless, reality often is ignored, and copyright is viewed as
property although it functions as regulation.
Because the issue of copyright as property or regulation remains unresolved, courts have treated copyright as
both-sometimes as one, sometimes as the other.2 9 The resulting
26, See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
27. See id. at §§ 107-18.
28. See id. at §§ 111 (cable television license), 115 (recording license), 116 (jukebox
license), 118 (noncommercial broadcasting license).
29. The test for whether a ruling is proprietary or regulatory is whether the ruling
favors the economic interest of copyright owners or the public's right to access. Under this
test, a ruling that a hotel performs a musical work by receiving radio broadcasts for its
guests' rooms is proprietary, Buck v. Jewel-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); a ruling
that a commercial establishment receiving radio broadcasts of musical compositions does
not commit infringement is regulatory, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151 (1975); a ruling that permits videotaping copyrighted works off-the-air is regulatory,
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); and a ruling that the use
of copyrighted material in a news report is copyright infringement is proprietary, Harper&
Row Publishers, 105 S. Ct. at 2218. Compare Buck, 283 U.S. at 191, with Fortnightly Corp.
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confusion over copyright's nature has obscured copyright's relevance to free speech and the fair use doctrine's function. Consequently, the confusion has caused an unnecessary restraint on consumer access to copyrighted material even though public access is
the constitutional justification for copyright.
The Copyright Act of 1976 brought these problems to the forefront by extending copyright, as developed for the printing press,
to new technology, particularly television and the computer3o Applying traditional copyright doctrines to these new means of communication creates doctrinal issues submerged beneath the pragmatic concerns of commerce. The formerly clear-cut distinction
between product and process, which underlay traditional copyright, served as a practical limitation on the copyright owner's
right to control access to the product. This distinction no longer
prevails. The paradigm of copyright is a book. Although the book
is clearly the product of the printing press, one never would confuse the book with the printing process. The line of demarcation
between the television broadcasting process and the work broadcast,3 1 on the other hand, is not so clear.
The interdependence of process and product greatly enhances
copyright owners' ability to control consumer access to copyrighted
works and thereby creates a threat to copyright's constitutional
purpose: the promotion of learning. The new technology, however,
is a two-edged sword. Although new technology provides the entrepreneur with the opportunity for new profit, it also provides the
consumer with the ability to trespass on the copyright owner's
statutory domain by making his own copies quickly, cheaply, and
anonymously.3 2 This threat of trespass has been deemed to necessitate the copyright owner's greater control of access.
The core of the controversy is how large the copyright owner's
domain should be in order to control consumer access to the copyrighted work. This problem is not capable of easy solution, for the
issue of the nature of copyright as proprietary or regulatory, when
reduced to its essentials, involves both economic and social issues.
v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (regulatory ruling that cable television
company that retransmits for profit television broadcasts of copyrighted motion pictures
does not infringe copyright). The point is not that these rulings are correct or incorrect. The
point is that they are inconsistent.
30. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 7.
31. See, e.g., Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 398 ("[B]oth broadcaster and viewer play
crucial roles in the total television process . .

").

32. Consider, for example, developments in photocopying, satellite transm;ssions,
audio and video recording, and computer-based information storage and retrieval systems.
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The premise necessarily determines the conclusion. If copyright is
property, the economic arguments prevail. If, on the other hand,
copyright is regulation, the social arguments prevail.
Given the complexity of the issues involved, it is not only useful but necessary to return to the origin of copyright in a search for
fundamentals. The basic fundamental in American copyright law is
the copyright clause. It, therefore, serves as our starting point. An
examination of the clause in the context of the events of the day
and in light of the origins of Anglo-American copyright provides
useful insights concerning copyright's nature.
The clause itself reveals the theory of copyright embodied in
the Constitution: an exclusive right, for a limited period of time, of
authors to reproduce their writings for sale in order to promote
learning. The protection Congress was empowered to grant for economic gain was to be given in return for the author's making the
work available to the public. The public purpose of copyright, consumer access to the work, was to be implemented by its private
function, rewarding the author for his efforts. The constitutional
scheme, however, was more subtle than the clause's language made
apparent, for its inplementation required a subtle distinction-recognition of the difference between the work that is the
subject of copyright and the copyright itself.
The distinction between the work and the copyright of the
work is made clear by the definition of copyright-a series of rights
to which a given work is subject, for example, the right to print,
reprint, publish, and vend the work. 33 With this distinction in
mind, it is easy to see that there is a difference between the use of
the copyright and the use of the work. One who exercises a right
reserved to the copyright owner uses the copyright; one who makes
a use of the work without exercising a right reserved to the copyright owner uses the work, but not the copyright. The crucial point
is that the two uses are not reflexive. To use the copyright is to use
the work, but to use the work is not necessarily to use the
copyright.
While it apparently has not been articulated, the distinction
between the use of the work and the use of the work's copyright
has a sound historical basis and was adhered to substantially until
the 1909 Copyright Revision Act.3 4 Following the enactment of the
33.

These rights were given in the first United States copyright statute, the Copyright

Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
34.

17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976).
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Statute of Anne in England, printing an author's work without his
consent-a use of the copyright-was a copyright infringement,
but abridging the work and printing the abridgment-a use of the
work-was not.3 5 The doctrine that abridgements, digests, and
translations did not infringe the works upon which they were
based was good law in this country during the nineteenth century.. 6 In the 1909 Copyright Act, however, Congress abrogated the
doctrine37 and made two fundamental changes in copyright law.
First, it unwittingly enlarged the copyright owner's rights in
printed works to include-in addition to the rights to print, reprint, publish, and vend the copyrighted work-the exclusive right
to copy the copyrighted work. Second, it gave the publisher, or entrepreneur, the right to claim copyright directly, rather than
merely as an assignee of the author. These changes in the copyright statute provided a predicate for the corruption of the fair use
doctrine. The consequences of these developments for the rights of
free speech, however, did not become apparent until Congress, in
the 1976 Copyright Act, conferred copyright protection from the
moment of fixation, eliminated the requirement of publication, and
applied traditional copyright principles to' new communication
technology. Between 1909 and the adoption of the 1976 Act, the
fair use doctrine, which courts view as a means of reconciling copyright and free speech concerns, was corrupted and ceased to be a
fair competitive use doctrine. Instead, it became a device for enhancing the copyright owner's control of access to the copyrighted
work.
This Article's purpose is to demonstrate that these changes,
which arguably were constitutionally impermissible, have created a
conflict between copyright and free speech rights. The Article argues that the solution to this problem is a rational fair use doctrine
based on the distinction between use of the work and use of the
copyright. Recognition of this distinction provides the basis for a
coherent theory of copyright consistent with the framers' intention
and compatible with modern conditions. I first deal, in Part II of
this Article, with the copyright clause and its inherent free speech
limitations in light of the origin of Anglo-American copyright and
35. Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141, 3 Atk. 270, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (H.L. 1740); Tonson v.
Walker, 3 Swans. 672, 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (App. 1752). For a discussion of these and other

cases, see W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW, ch.2 (1985).
36. E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 158 (1879).
37.

17 U.S.C. § 1(b) (1976).

IN

FREE SPEECH AND COPYRIGHT

1987]

the subsequent development of copyright law in this country. Part
III then explores the origin of the fair use doctrine and its corruption by the Copyright Act of 1909. Part IV discusses the development of the notion that copyright is property. Finally, Part V explains how American copyright law has gone astray and what must
be done to place it back on its proper course.
II.

THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND FREE SPEECH

The copyright clause contains no express reference to free
speech, and there is little direct evidence of the framers' intention
concerning the relationship between the clause and free speech
concerns. Proof that the framers intended free speech rights to circumscribe the power of Congress to grant copyright, therefore, is
necessarily circumstantial. Three types of circumstantial evidence
should be considered: (1) contemporary evidence relating to the
clause's adoption; (2) evidence concerning the nature of copyright
in 1787 as it had developed in England; and (3) the judicial treatment of copyright in the nineteenth-century United States as the
treatment related to free speech doctrines. The plan is to use 1787
as a vantage point and to look backward in England and forward
in the United States.
A.

The Adoption of the Copyright Clause

The copyright clause, as a part of the original Constitution,
predated the free speech clause by several years. The first amendment, however, merely memorialized an understanding about free
speech that the text of the original Constitution already embodied.
The text of the debate that accompanied the first amendment's
adoption acknowledged and explained this understanding.3 8 As
Madison explained: "[N]o power whatever over the press was supposed to be delegated to the Constitution, as it originally stood,
and the [first] amendment was intended as a positive and absolute
'3 9
reservation of [such power].
If Madison was correct, how does one explain the copyright
clause? Two points are relevant. First, the copyright clause is in
fact "the promotion of Science" clause:4 0 the only provision of sec38. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guaranteeof a Freedom of Expression, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 91, 119 (1984).
39. J. MADISON, REPORT ACCOMPANYING THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTION, reprinted in 4 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 572 (J. Elliott ed. 1866 & photo. reprint 1941).

40.

As Roger Sherman, a Connecticut delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
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tion eight of the Constitution defining the purpose of, and therefore limiting, a power granted to Congress. Second, the promotion
of learning is inherently antithetical to censorship. Consequently,
the clause gives Congress only the power to secure to authors the
right to the writings they create. If Congress could secure to publishers control over the writings they publish, Congress would have
the power to control the press and inhibit learning. By excluding
publishers from the copyright clause, the framers avoided giving
Congress the power to reward or punish the press. The copyright
clause, in short, means what it says: It limits the power of Congress
to grant copyright to authors.
The argument that the framers intentionally excluded publishers from the copyright clause is supported by three lines of evidence: (1) Madison's association with proposals for state copyright
legislation during the confederation; (2) his comment on copyright
in the FederalistPapers; and, most importantly, (3) the manifest
concern that the new national government have no power to control the press. Madison was a member of the committee that offered to the Continental Congress a resolution urging the states "to
secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto
printed" copyright protection. As a result of that resolution, eleven
states enacted copyright statutes. 41 That the resolution encouraged
copyright protection for "authors or publishers" by laws and
wrote:

The new powers vested in the United States, are, to regulate commerce; provide for a
uniform practice respecting naturalization, bankruptcies and organizing, arming and
training the militia; and for the punishment of certain crimes against the United
States; and for promoting the progress of science in the mode therein pointed out.
XV THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, Vol. 3, 281 (1984) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
XV THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].

41. The resolution read as follows:
Resolved, That it be recommended to the several States, to secure to the authors or
publishers of any new books not hitherto printed, being citizens of the United States,
and to their executors, administrators and assigns, the copy right of such books for a
certain time not less than fourteen years from the first publication; and to secure to the
said authors, if they shall survive the term first mentioned, and to their executors,
administrators and assigns, the copy right of such books for another term of time not
less than fourteen years, such copy or exclusive right of printing, publishing and vending the same, to be secured to the original authors, or publishers, their executors, administrators and assigns, by such laws and under such restrictions as to the several
States may seem proper.
Copyright Enactments, supra note 4, at 1. Connecticut already had enacted a copyright
statute, and apparently Delaware did not enact one. Thus, twelve of the thirteen states had
copyright acts. Id. The resolution obviously was based on the Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch.
19, because its content reflects the provisions of that statute.
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"under such restrictions as to the several states may seem proper"
indicates that the committee felt it was appropriate, at least for
the states, to grant copyright to both publishers and authors.
After urging the states to grant copyright to both publishers
and authors, Madison wrote of the federal copyright clause in the
FederalistPapers:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy right of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common
law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the
inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases, with the claims of
individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either
of the cases, and most of them have anticipated
the decision of this point, by
42
laws passed at the instance of Congress.

Madison's mention of the common-law copyright referred to either
Millar v. Taylor" or Donaldson v. Beckett, 44 the two major cases
interpreting the Statute of Anne, the English copyright act of
1710.45 The specific reference, however, is not clear, for both cases
support Madison's statement. Millar, a 1769 King's Bench decision, held that an author had a common-law copyright in
perpetuity despite the statute. Donaldson, a 1774 House of Lords
decision, held that an author had a common-law copyright in his
works, but only until publication, after which he must look to the
statute for protection. Because Donaldson overruled Millar,
Madison's language suggests that he was referring to Donaldson.
The specific reference, however, does not affect Madison's argument because the nature of common-law copyright envisioned in
both cases was the same-"the sole printing and publishing of a
work." 4 6 In both cases the plaintiff was a bookseller-publisher

seeking to secure rights as an assignee of the author.
The resolution in the Continental Congress shows that
Madison could not have been ignorant of the publisher's role in
copyright. Moreover, the exclusion of the publisher from the copyright clause was contrary to all copyright precedent, including Millar and Donaldson, the Statute of Anne, and the state copyright
statutes. The English background suggests that the omission resulted from a conscious concern for a free press. Why, however,
was it proper for the states to grant copyright protection to pub42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
2311, 98

THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. MADIsoN).

4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1769).
4 Burr. 2407, 98 Eng. Rep. 257; 17 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. Eng. 953 (H.L. 1774).
8 ANNE ch. 19.
This was the definition used in both Millar and Donaldson. See, e.g., 4 Burr. 2303,
Eng. Rep. 201, 206.
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lishers, but not for Congress to do so?
Professor William Mayton, in a brilliant analysis of the origin
of the first amendment, 47 provides the reason: the manifest concern that the national government have no control over the press.
Mayton's thesis is that although the first amendment denied Congress any power to make laws regulating the press, this prohibition
did not extend to the states, which retained the power, for example, to grant remedies for libel and defamation under their general
police power. Under this view, the exclusion of publishers from the
federal copyright clause, while states properly provided copyright
to publishers, made eminent sense. Giving Congress the power to
grant copyright to publishers would have given it the power to
make a law regulating the press, to which the press would have
been particularly vulnerable because of their economic interests.
The power to grant copyright to authors also could have given
Congress the power to regulate the press. This result, however, was
avoided by limiting copyright protection to the property the authors already had and by giving them a limited right to control the
property's distribution for profit.48 The purpose of copyright-the
promotion of learning-also minimized this danger because learning required access.
The Constitution's framers insisted that the original document
gave Congress no power to control the press. James Wilson, who
played a major role in the Constitutional Convention as a member
of the Committee of Detail, which prepared the first draft of the
Constitution, and the Committee of Style, which put the Constitution into final form, argued this point in his speech at a public
meeting in Philadelphia in 1787. Explaining why the omission of a
bill of rights was not a defect in the proposed constitution, he said:
47. Mayton, supra note 38.
48. In the Pennsylvania debates on the adoption of the Constitution, Thomas McKean, explaining why a bill of rights was unnecessary, discussed the powers granted to
Congress:

[T]he power of securing to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their writings
and discoveries could only with effect be exercised by the Congress. For, sir, the laws of
the respective states could only operate within their respective boundaries, and therefore, a work which had cost the author his whole life to complete, when published in
one state, however it might there be secured, could easily be carried into another state
in which a republication would be accompanied with neither penalty not punishment-a circumstance manifestly injurious to the author in particular, and to the cause
of science in general.
II THE

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION OF

THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA

TARY HISTORY].

415 (1976) [hereinafter II

THE DOCUMEN-
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For instance, the liberty of the press, which has been a copious source of
declamation and opposition, what controul [sic] can proceed from the
foederal [sic] government to shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of national freedom? If indeed, a power similar to that which has been granted for
the regulation of commerce, had been granted to regulate literary publications, it would have been as necessary to stipulate that the liberty of the
press should 4 be
preserved inviolate, as that the impost should be general in
9
its operation.

Despite these reassurances, Congress' power to secure to authors the right to their writings caused concern for the liberty of
the press and was one of the justifications for the adoption of the
first amendment . 5 ° That amendment makes plain what the copyright clause implies-Congress cannot make a law for the promo-

tion of learning that also can be used to inhibit learning. The copyright clause, in short, incorporates free speech constraints to limit
congressional power over the press.
If the copyright clause had empowered Congress to grant
copyright protection directly to publishers, objections to the power
as a threat to the liberty of the press surely would have been
stronger and more well founded. The English experience with
using copyright to control the press had involved publishers, not
49.

XIII THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, COM-

MENTARIES

THE

ON THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, Vol. 1, 340

(1981) [hereinafter XIII

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].

50. The concern was voiced in the Pennsylvania debates:
Tho it is not declared that Congress have a power to destroy the liberty of the press;
yet, in effect they will have it. For they will have the powers of self-preservation. They
have a power to secure to authors the right of their writings. Under this, they may
license the press, no doubt; and under licensing the press, they may suppress it.
II THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 454:
This concern was also voiced in a newspaper article's response to James Wilson's
speech:
Does this constitution possess, as you assert, no influence whatever upon the press? Is
there not a provision in it to secure for a limited time to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. I do not mean to call in
question the propriety of this provision, but I would ask, whether under it the press
may not be considered subject to the influence and controul [sic] of this government?-Will it be denied that this power includes in it (in some measure) that of regulating literary publications? [Clertainly it cannot, unless we suppose what would be
very absurd, that authors, who are to be secured the exclusive right of their writings,
are at the same time to be deprived of the use of the press. This then, being the case, it
clearly follows, and you have admitted it, that a stipulationfor preserving inviolate
the liberty of the press was necessary and proper.-And hence too it evidently appears, that the silence, which is observed on this interesting subject, was not occasioned by the extremely delicate consideration to which you attribute it. To what cause
then is the omission, and your attempts to deceive your fellow citizens, to be
ascribed?-The press is the scourge of tyrants and the grand palladium of liberty."
XIII DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 49, at 479.
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authors. Because the eighteenth century controversy in England
over copyright and the nature of literary property also involved
freedom of the press concerns, the framers of the copyright clause
surely were aware of this relationship between publishers' copyright and government control.51 In the House of Lords debate concerning the question of literary property in Donaldson v. Beckett,
for example, Lord Effingham
begged to urge the liberty of the press, as the strongest argument against this
property; adding that a despotic minister, hearing of a pamphlet which might
strike at his measures, may buy the copy, and by printing 20 copies, secure it
his own, and by that
means the public would be deprived of the most inter52
esting information.

A monopoly of the press, of course, was held by publishers,
not authors. The authors created the works, the publishers distributed them. The monopoly potential arose not from the fact of creation, but from the right to control distribution. Lord Mansfield's
definition of copyright in Millar v. Taylor demonstrates this point:
"I use the word 'copy,' in the technical sense in which that name or
term has been used for ages, to signify an incorporeal right to the
sole printing and publishing of somewhat intellectual, communicated by letters." 58 The author's property right per se did not pose
any threat of press control because even the most prolific author
would produce only a fraction of the press output. By contrast, the
publisher, who could control the distribution of the work of many
authors, did pose such a threat.
Against this historical background, it is important to remember what copyright entailed and did not entail at that time. At the
time copyright owners had the exclusive right to publish works as
those works were written, but only for a limited period of
time-fourteen years with a possible renewal term of an additional
fourteen years. Copyright owners did not have the exclusive right
to prepare derivative works, such as abridgements, translations, or
digests. The distinction between the use of the copyright and the
use of the work, therefore, was fundamental. The extent to which
the contemporary nature of a concept embodied in the Constitution should govern the exercise of congressional power in imple51. See, e.g., S. Parks, ed., Freedom of the Press and the Literary Property Debate:
Six Tracts, 1755-1770 (1974), reprintedin THE ENGLISH BooK TRADE, 1660-1853, "156 Ti-

tles relating to the early history of English Publishing, Bookselling, the Struggle for Copyright and the Freedom of the Press Reprinted in photo-facsimile in 42 volumes."
52.

17 Cosswrr's PARL. HisT. 1003 (1813).

53. 4 Burr. 2303, 2396, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 251 (K.B. 1769).
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menting that concept is a matter of debate. When the issue is as
fundamental as free speech, however, it is reasonable to assume
that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to give Congress the power to do indirectly, through copyright legislation,
what they denied it the power to do directly in the first amendment. The point is not that Congress cannot provide copyright for
derivative works, but that Congress cannot do so in a manner that
inhibits free speech rights. In other words, Congress cannot inhibit
learning.
The argument that the copyright clause was designed to prevent Congress from infringing free speech rights by incorporating
free speech values is both analytical and structural. The analytical
argument is based on copyright's purpose of promoting learning.
The distinction between the use of the copyright and the use of the
work clearly promoted this goal. Congress could promote learning
by enacting a content-based copyright statute that provided protection only for a work that promotes learning or by enacting a
copyright statute that ensured public access to the copyrighted
work. By enacting a content-based copyright statute, Congress
would be able to control and censor the press. A copyright statute
that ensures public access to the copyrighted work, on the other
hand, would be anticensorship in nature.
The structural argument follows from the foregoing analytical
argument. First, the framers did not want to give Congress power
to control the press. Second, the copyright power eventually
granted Congress could be exercised for the author's benefit only,
not the publisher's. In view of the framers' concern that the national government be given no power over the press, we can assume that in drafting the copyright clause, they also contemplated
the excess baggage of censorship that had burdened the English
copyright. One way of jettisoning that baggage was to limit Congress' power to the granting of copyright to creators and to eliminate publishers from the copyright equation. The English background, to which we now turn, demonstrates the legitimacy of the
framers' concern.
B.

The English Background

The importance of the English background to American copyright law is shown by the title of the Statute of Anne's almost
surely providing the source for the language in the copyright
clause. The Statute of Anne was entitled "An act for the encouragement of learning by vesting copies of printed books in the au-
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thors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned. ' 54 All of the title's elements-authors, writings, limited
times, learning, and purchasers of copies-are included in the
copyright clause with one exception: the purchasers of copies, or
publishers. The immediate question, however, is not why the copyright clause excluded publishers, but why the Statute of Anne included them.
The Statute of Anne included publishers because publishers in
England created copyright as a private-law concept designed to
benefit themselves, not authors. The copyright created by the publishers was the stationers' copyright. More specifically, the copyright was created by the Stationers' Company, the London Company of the booktrade 5 The Catholic Queen Mary granted a royal
charter to the guild of stationers in 1556,56 and the Protestant
Queen Elizabeth I renewed the charter in 1559. 5 The motivation
for chartering the guild in both instances was the same: to secure
the stationers as allies in royal efforts to control the output of the
press during a time of religious controversy that threatened the
government's stability. The charter, therefore, was a boon to the
stationers as businessmen because it secured their control of the
booktrade. The stationers were more than willing to serve as policemen of the press for the sovereign, whose primary concern was
not who printed, but what was printed.
The importance of the stationers' copyright for present purposes is twofold. First, the stationers' copyright was an instrument
of monopoly and a device of censorship given legal support by the
54.

8 ANNE ch.19 (1709).

55. For a detailed history of the stationers' copyright, see L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
(1968). C. BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS' COMPANY: A HISTORY 14031959 (1960), is a one volume history of the company. Early records of the company have
been transcribed and provide valuable source material for those interested in the details of
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

the stationers' copyright. A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS
OF LONDON 1554-1640 A.D. (E. Arber ed. 1876) (five vols.) [hereinafter ARmER]; A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE WORSHIPFUL COMPANY OF STATIONERS 1640-1708 AD. (Eyre
& Rivington eds. 1914) (three vols.) [hereinafter EYRE & RIVINGTON]. Also transcribed are
Court Books B and C, records of the transactions of the Court of Assistants, the governing

body of the Company. See RECORDS OF THE COURT OF THE STATIONERS' COMPANY, 1576 TO
1602 (W. Greg & E. Boswell eds. 1930) (Court Book B); RECORDS OF THE COURT OF THE
STATIONERS' COMPANY 1602 TO 1640 (W. Jackson ed. 1957).
56. I ARBER, supra note 55, at xxiv. The charter is transcribed at I ARBER, supra note
55, at xxvii-xxxii.
57.

I

ARBER,

supra note 55, at xxxii. The religious controversy in England, precipi-

tated by Henry VIII's break with Rome, was a substantial threat to the stability of the
government and was one, if not the only, major reason for press control. Thus, it is not by

coincidence that the first amendment protects the freedom of religion as well as the press.
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decrees, ordinances, and acts of press control. Second, it served as
the model for the Anglo-American statutory copyright. Because
the stationers' copyright has been obscured by its statutory successor, discussing the copyright in some detail will be useful.
1. The Stationers' Copyright
The Stationers' Company was a cartel and, as such, faced
competition from both within and outside of the company. Because the Stationers' Company was self-governing, the stationers
were free to create rules governing who had the right to print what,
as long as what was published did not offend the sovereign's interest. Competition from within the company, therefore, was dealt
with through the imposition of internal rules.58 The stationers' regulations, however, were not binding on nonmembers and constituted no protection against outside competition. As a cartel, the
company exercised its control over nonmembers through economic
might rather than legal right. Consequently, the stationers sought
laws, which were more efficacious than company rules, to support
their copyright and to sustain their cartel.
The stationers found the support they needed in the laws of
press control, which provided protection against outside competition. Throughout the reign of censorship in England, the stationers
avidly pressed lawmaking authorities with arguments concerning
the importance of censorship to good governance. The stationers'
arguments emphasized the efficacy of their copyright as a useful
device to assist in controlling the press. For the most part, they
succeeded. Beginning with the Star Chamber Decree of 158659 and
ending in 1694 with the final demise of the Licensing Act of 1662,60
and even including ordinances during the Interregnum,6 ' the laws
governing the press also protected the stationers' copyright.2 The
end of press control and, thus, the end of legal support for their
copyright and cartel caused the stationers to seek new protective
legislation. Fifteen years later the Statute of Anne was passed by
58. See, e.g., Ordinances of the Company made in 1678, 1681, and 1683. I ARBER,
supra note 55, at 5-26.
59. Transcribed in II ARBER, supra note 55, at 807-12. A more important decree was
the Star Chamber Decree of 1637, transcribed at IV ARBER, supra note 55, at 528-36.
60. 14 Car. II ch. 33 (1662).
61. The principal acts of censorship during the Interregnum were the Ordinance of
1643, I. C. FIRTH & R. RAft, ACTS & ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM 1642-1660 184-86
(1911); the Ordinance of 1647, id. 1021-23; and the Ordinance of 1649, C. FIRTH & R. RAIT,
ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM 1642-1660 245-54 (1911).
62. See L. Patterson, supra note 55, ch. 6, "Copyright and Censorship" (1968).
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Parliament.
The stationers' private copyright was directed to the problem
of intracompany competition. Because only members of the company could print and publish, their problem was not protecting the
right to publish a work against all the world, but only protecting
the right as against each other. The solution was simple: a stationer registered the title of his "copie" or manuscript6 3 in the
company's register books. 6 4 By registering the title of a work, a stationer acquired the right to publish that work in perpetuity and to
assign or devise that right. How a member acquired title to the
work he registered was of no concern to the company, and because
authors could not be members of the company, they had no rights
in the copyright acquired by registration. Copyright was a matter
of business for businessmen only. 5
With the exception of the printing patent, granted by the sovereign under the royal prerogative,6 6 the stationers' copyright was
63. The term copyright is derived not from the verb "to copy," but from the noun
"copy," which indicates ownership of the manuscript. The entries in the Stationers' Registers were in the form of "entered for his copie." The term "copy right" was not used in the
Registers until 1701, and then in an unusual context. An entry to Timothy Childe dated
May 31, 1701, contained the note: "I doe declare yt Mr Awnsham Churchill is and shall been
intituled to one moiety of this book & copy right, & also to one moiety of all benefitt and
advantage arriseing thereby." III EYRE & RIVINGTON, supra note 55, at 494. A similar note
between the same parties is dated August 6, 1703. Id. at 496.
64. An ordinance providing a penalty for a member who published another's copy
recited:
. . .by ancient Usage of this Company, when any Book or Copy is duly Entred in the
Register Book of this Company, to any Member or Members of the Company, such
Person to whom such Entrey is made, is, and always hath been reputed and taken to be
Proprietor of such Book or Copy, and ought to have the sole Printing thereof ..
Ordinances Made in 1681, par. V., I ARBER, supra note 55, at 22.
65. In view of the publishers' role in creating copyright, Arber's introductory comment
to the Transcripts contains a note of irony: "The time has now come when the English
Printer and the English Publisher must take their due places in the national estimation.
Hitherto the Author has had it all his own way." I ARBER, supra note 55, at xiii.
66. The printing patent was merely one example of letters patent granted under the
sovereign's royal prerogative, defined as "the power of the king to do things which no one
else could do, and his power to do them in a way in which no one else could do them."
ADAMS,CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 78 (1921). Commonly used to grant monopolies of various kinds, the letters patent also were granted for the printing of various works,
for example, the Bible, prayer books, and school books (most notably the ABC Book, the
first reading book of Elizabethan children), as well as individual works of specific authorship. The first printing patent apparently was granted in 1518, A. POLLARD, SHAKESPEARE'S
FIGHT WITH THE PIRATES AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSMISSION OF HIS TEXT 3 (1920), the

last apparently in 1693, I J. DUNTON,

THE LIFE AND ERRORS OF JOHN DUNTON

153 (1818).

Arber transcribed several printing patents. See, e.g., II ARBER, supra note 55, at 15, 16, 60,
61, 63, 746.
The printing patent and the stationers' copyright served the same function of protect-

1987]

FREE SPEECH AND COPYRIGHT

the only copyright in England until the Statute of Anne created
the statutory copyright. The stationers' copyright served as the basis for the statutory copyright. The stationers' copyright, therefore,
is the ultimate source of the modern American copyright, which
still contains a vestige of the stationers' copyright-the requirement of registration-6 7 -as well as a vestige unique to its statutory
successor-the termination right of the author.6 8 The "author's"
copyright, therefore, began as a private-law right of publishers unsanctioned by public law other than the laws of press control.
Its dependence on policies of press control ensured the mortality of the stationers' copyright. The Licensing Act of 1662,69 which
lapsed by its own terms after two years, was renewed periodically,7 0 until 1694 when Parliament refused to renew it again. The
stationers' copyright thus was deprived of its legal imprimatur. By
this time, however, copyrights were concentrated in the hands of
the booksellers, or publishers. The booksellers had created their
own cartel. Resentment toward this cartel was a major reason why
Parliament rejected the booksellers' efforts first to secure renewal
of the Licensing Act and then to secure new legislation. 7' When the
ing a published work from piracy. The similarity of function is indicated by the report of a
Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the controversy within the Stationers' Company in the 1580s. The report said that when works are not covered by a privilege (a patent), "the companie do order emongest them selves that he which bringeth a booke to be
printed should vse yt as a priviledge." II ARBER, supra note 55, at 784. In case of a conflict
between the printing patent and the stationers' copyright, the former prevailed. See "John
Bill's History of Doctor Fulke's Answer to the Rhemish Testament," III ARBER, supra note
55, at 39 (showing how a grant of a patent to the deceased author's daughter prevailed over
the stationers' copyright).
A patent for making playing cards, which was an industrial patent deemed by the stationers to be a printing patent because it involved printing, was voided in The Case of
Monopolies (D'Arcy v. Allen), 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260; Moore (K.B.) 671, 72
Eng. Rep. 830; Noy, 173, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131.
The abuse of the royal prerogative finally led to the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I ch. 3 (1623). The statute limited "Letters Patent and Grants of Privilege"
to a term of fourteen years, but excluded letters patent "concerning Printing." In the end,
however, it was the stationers' copyright, not the printing patent, that survived to serve as
the basis for the statutory copyright.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1982); cf. 8 Anne ch. 19, § 11 (1709).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1982); cf. 8 Anne ch. 19, § XI (1709).
69. 14 CAR. II, ch. 33 (1662).
70. 16 CAR. II ch. 8 (1664); 17 CAR. II ch. 4 (1665); I JAc. II ch. 17, § 15 (1685); 4 & 5
W. & M. ch. 24, § XIV (1692).
71. See "The House of Commons Remonstrances against Revival of the Licensing Act
of 1662," XI H. C. JouR. 305-06 (1695). Among the objections was the following: "3. Because
that Act prohibits printing any thing before Entry thereof in the Register of the Company
of Stationers, . . . ; and the said Company are impowered to hinder the printing all innocent and useful Books; and have an Opportunity to enter a Title to themselves, and their
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booksellers succeeded in securing the passage of the Statute of
Anne, they received more than they had bargained for-a trade
regulation statute designed to destroy their cartel.7 2
2.

The Statutory Copyright

The stationers' copyright, which operated as a device of censorship and cartel, was succeeded by a statutory copyright
designed as an anticensorship, anticartel device. The draftsmen of
the new statute turned to the Licensing Act of 1662 for guidance,
and consequently every substantive provision of the Statute of
Anne either had a counterpart in the Licensing Act or served to
negate the monopolistic and censorial characteristics of the copyright that Act protected. 3 Yet it is not quite accurate to say that
74
"[c]opyright is the uniquely legitimate offspring of censorship.
The stationers' copyright existed independently of censorship. Although the laws of press control gave legal support to the stationers' copyright, they were not its legal source. Acts of censorship
protected the stationers' copyright, but they neither created nor
defined it. Consequently, the demise of press control, in itself, did
not deprive copyright-the right to control the printing and publishing of a work-of its efficacy as a device of censorship. The
demise merely denied governmental officials the right to use copyright for this purpose.
The essential element-monopolistic control-was and is the
source of copyright's power as a device of censorship. The Statute
Friends, for what belongs to, and is the Labour and Right of, others." Id. at 305-06.
For a detailed account of the booksellers' efforts to secure new legislation, see L. PATTERSON, supra note 55, at 138-42.
72. See Patterson, The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
223 (1966).
73. Of the eleven sections of the Statute of Anne, three (sections VI, VIII, and X) were
procedural in nature and two (section III, which provided an alternative means of securing
copyright if registration were refused, and section XI, which gave a renewal term of copyright to the author) were clearly antimonopolistic in purpose. Section I set the pattern of
copyright's general scheme and was also clearly antimonopolistic in its fourteen year limit
on the term of copyright. The remaining five sections can be traced to provisions in the
Licensing Act. Compare § II of the Statute of Anne with § III of the Licensing Act (entry of
books' titles in the register book of the Stationers' Company); § IV of the Statute of Anne
(public officials to whom complaint could be made about the prices of books) with § IV of
the Licensing Act (officials to serve as licensers of books); § V of the Statute of Anne with
§ XVII of the Licensing Act (delivery of copies of books to libraries); § VII of the Statute of
Anne with §§ V and VI of the Licensing Act (relating to importation of books); and § IX of
the Statute of Anne with § XXII of the Licensing Act (the saving clause that related to
printing patents).
74. Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1970).
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of Anne, therefore, was not intended to benefit authors so much as
it was intended to limit the power of publishers. The English act
was directed at two evils: the disorder in the booktrade created by
the demise of the Licensing Act, and the booksellers' cartel.
The statutory solution to these problems was to destroy the
publishers' monopoly and to prevent its recurrence. The statute,
however, contained two compromises that in the end proved costly
to the cause of copyright law. One compromise, a seemingly small
price, was the continuation of the stationers' copyrights for a period of twenty-one years. 75 The other, which entailed a larger price,
was that the publishers could enjoy all the rights of the new statutory copyright as assignees of the author. Besides these two compromises, the statute addressed the monopoly problem directly.
First, the statute gave copyright a limited, fourteen-year
term, 78 with a fourteen-year renewal term available to the author
at the end of the first term if he was "then living."' 77 Prior to the

Statute of Anne, the stationers' copyright was deemed to provide
copyright protection-the exclusive right of publication-in
perpetuity. The stationers' copyright, therefore, purported to preempt the public domain. Consequently, works of such authors as
Shakespeare, Milton, and Dryden were protected by the copyright
monopoly forever. By limiting the term of copyright, the Statute of
Anne created, or at least reestablished, a public domain for books,
because after the statutory copyright expired, a work was available
to all persons for all uses including publication. Furthermore, making the renewal term available only to the author fulfilled two purposes: it benefited authors, and it further limited the publishers'
cartel. Second, the statute made copyright available to anyone entitled to it, not merely to stationers or to authors. 78 It ensured this
provision's efficacy by providing an alternative means of obtaining
copyright: advertising the title in the Gazette if the clerk of the
company refused to register it in the stationers' register book.7 9
75. 8 Anne ch. 19, § I (1709).
76. Id.
77. Id. at § XI.
78. Id. at § I.
79. Id. at § III. The Gazette was
[t]he official publication of the English government, also called the "London Gazette."
It is evidence of acts of state, and of everything done by the Queen in her political
capacity. Orders of adjudication in bankruptcy are required to be published therein;
and the production of a copy of the "Gazette," containing a copy of the order of adjudication, is evidence of the fact, and of the date thereof.
BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 613 (5th ed. 1979).
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Third, to prevent the recapture of copyright and thereby protect
the public domain, the statute required the creation of a new work
as a condition for copyright.8 0 Finally, the statute contained an explicit provision for controlling the prices of books.8 1
The justification for this regulatory scheme, and the master
stroke, was that the statute's purpose was not to protect the property of either publishers or authors, but to promote learning by
encouraging authors to create works. The statute primarily served
the public interest. The Statute of Anne created a statutory copyright with three dimensions-cultural, economic, and social. First,
by using copyright as an incentive to create, the statute encouraged authors to contribute to the culture of society. Second, by
protecting the right to publish a work, it gave entrepreneurs the
incentive to distribute the works. Finally, by limiting the rights of
the copyright owner to rights that were economic in nature, it gave
the user freedom to use the work for the purpose of learning.
The Statute of Anne served as a source for the copyright
clause. The question, however, remains: Why did the draftsmen of
the copyright clause exclude publishers? The English experience
with the Statute of Anne indicates that publishers were omitted
for good reason. Publishers fought against, and almost wrecked,
the statute's scheme of preventing the use of copyright as a monopolistic device easily used for censorship purposes. The publishers' near success can be explained by the two compromises mentioned above: the extension of the stationers' copyright for twentyone years and the endowment of the author's assignee with all the
rights of copyright.
The first compromise meant that the booksellers' cartel continued as before and that the statute's meaning would not be litigated for at least two decades after its passage. As it turned out,
the statute was not definitively interpreted until 1774, more than
six decades after its enactment. By that time, the contemporary
events that shaped the statute's content were history. It was as if
the right to perform a musical composition for profit under the
1909 Copyright Revision Act had been presented to the Supreme
Court for interpretation for the first time in 1974. During the
period between the statute's passage and 1774, the booksellers'
power remained undiminished, enabling them to do battle with full
resources some forty years after their cartel was supposed to be
80.
81.

8 Anne ch. 19, § I (1709).
Id. at § IV.
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terminated. s2
The second compromise-giving the assignee all the rights of
the author-played an even more important and ultimately determinative role in creating the confusion in copyright law. This provision enabled publishers to use authors as foils in their quest for
recognition of a perpetual common-law copyright. This perpetual
common-law copyright, ostensibly for the benefit of authors, could
be assigned to the publisher and, therefore, would effectively supersede the statutory copyright.
Given that statutory copyright was an author's right, it followed that the author received the right because he created the
work. From this premise, it took only a small leap of logic to conclude that the common law also recognized copyright under a natural law theory. "Ownership . . . is created by production and the
producer becomes the owner. 8 3 The idea "that authors have a nat-

ural right to the fruit of their labors is an ancient one. 8s4 The
notion that the statutory copyright was an author's copyright,
therefore, was neither unappealing nor without precedent, and the
booksellers' claim that the author was entitled to perpetual copyright by reason of creation was neither original nor revolutionary.
The publishers' purpose in making these claims, promoted under
the banner of the public good and the cause of learning, however,
was self-serving and, in a larger sense, antisocial.
The booksellers' strategy was simple and effective. They intended to obscure the cartel problem by focusing on the naturallaw property rights of the author. Because the author, by reason of
82. Despite the copyright statute, "there grew up a tacit understanding among the
booksellers of the eighteenth century that there should be no interference with each other's
lapsed copyrights." Gray, Alexander Donaldson and the Fight for Cheap Books, 38 JURID.
REV. 180, 193 (1926). That authors were entitled to copyright their works did not disturb the

booksellers.
In general, he affirmed, where authors keep their own copyright they do not succeed,

and many books have been consigned to oblivion through the inattention and mismanagement of publishers, as most of them are envious of the success of such works as they
do not turn to their own account. "[Authors] should sell their copyrights, or be previously well acquainted with the characters of their publishers." That some works having
a poor sale while the author had the copyright, had a rapid one when it was sold, was

asserted by Lackington to be indisputable; they were purposely kept back, he said, that
A.

the booksellers might obtain the copyright for a trifle from the disappointed author.
COLLINS, AUTHORSHIP IN THE DAYS OF JOHNSON 43 (1927) (quoting J. LACKINGTON,

MEMOIRS

83.

229 (1793)).
E.

DRONE,

A TREATISE

ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

5 (1879).

84. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970).
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the positive law of assignment, could convey the natural-law copyright to the bookseller, the common law would revive the privatelaw stationers' copyright, and the cartel would continue. The goals
of the Statute of Anne thus would be defeated and its limitations
overcome. The publishers, of course, had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has for cattle. The publishers' ulterior
motive was to revive the stationers' copyright in the guise of a
common-law copyright in order to perpetuate their cartel. 5 They
almost succeeded.
In Millar v. Taylors8 the King's Bench recognized the author's
common-law copyright and gave the booksellers what they wanted.
The court reached this conclusion even though no author was a
litigant in the case; the bookseller, true to form, sued as an assignee of the author. An excerpt from Justice Willes' opinion explains the relationship between the author and the bookseller and
the surrounding issues:
If the copy of the book belonged to the author, there is no doubt that he
might transfer it to the plaintiff. And if the plaintiff, by the transfer, is become to the proprietor of the copy, there is as little doubt that the defendant
has done him an injury, and violated his right: for which this action is the
proper remedy. But the terms of years secured.by 8 Ann. c. 19, is expired.
Therefore the author's title to the copy depends upon two questions1st. Whether the copy of a book, or literary composition, belongs to the
author, by the common law:
2d. Whether the common law-right
of authors to the copies of their own
87
works is taken away by 8 Ann. c. 19.

The majority in Millar concluded that the author had a common-law copyright by virtue of his creative act and that the common-law copyright superseded the statutory copyright. Lord
Mansfield's reasoning explains the conclusion:
[B]ecause it is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his
own ingenuity and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name,
without his consent. It is fit, that he should judge when to publish, or
whether he ever will publish. It is fit, he should not only choose the time, but
the manner of publication; how many; what volume; what print. It is fit, he
should choose to whose care he will trust the accuracy and correctness of the
impression; in whose honesty he will confide, not to foist in additions: with
other reasonings of the same effect.8
85. The booksellers' efforts began in 1731, the date their old copyrights expired under
the Statute of Anne, and lasted for some forty years. See L. PATTERSON, supra note 55, ch. 8,
"Copyright in England from 1710 to 1774."
86. 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
87. Id. at 2311, 98 Eng. Rep. at 206.
88. Id. at 2398, 98 Eng. Rep. at 252.
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Lord Mansfield's argument has three weaknesses. First, under
the Statute of Anne an author could exercise all the rights he
claimed were appropriate: an author could receive pecuniary profits, he could require the use of his name, he could decide when and
whether to publish, and he could control all other incidents of publication. Second, although an author could exercise these rights for
up to twenty-eight years, he was mortal. Rights in perpetuity
would be of little value to him, but of great value to the booksellers. Third, once an author conveyed his copy, all the rights that
Mansfield concluded were "just" and "fit" for the author passed to
the bookseller. Lord Mansfield, in short, was speaking for the
booksellers' rights hidden in the guise of the author's rights. It may
or may not be significant that Mansfield earlier had served as
counsel for booksellers "in most of the cases which have been cited
from Chancery ...."89
Recall that the Statute of Anne required a new work as a condition for statutory copyright. The author, as creator of the new
work, clearly had the right to "judge when to publish, or whether
he will ever publish," and nothing in the statute inhibited this
right. The bookseller, however, could own the copyright only by
reason of assignment. Ownership by reason of creation and ownership by way of assignment, of course, are subtantially different.
Natural-law arguments support the former, but not the latter.
Most important, however, is Mansfield's failure to make the
critical distinction between rights in the work and rights in the
copyright of the work. This failure is not surprising, because the
distinction was foreign to English jurisprudence. In the stationers'
vernacular, the term "copy right" meant ownership of the manuscript, and the statutory copyright was essentially a codification of
the stationers' copyright. Under the stationers' copyright, the distinction between the ownership of the physical object-the manuscript-and the rights resulting from ownership of the object was
not relevant because the physical object and the rights attendant
to it coincided: the bookseller held both. The assignment of ownership of the manuscript carried with it the right to publish." Own89. Id. at 2407, 98 Eng. Rep. at 257.
90. The distinction between the work and the copyright of the work is made clear in
the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976), which provides that the transfer of title to
the physical object does not transfer the copyright and vice versa. Courts, however, have not
utilized this distinction to recognize the difference between the use of the work and the use
of the copyright. For a discussion of the distinction between the ownership of the work and
the ownership of the common-law copyright, see Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., Inc.,
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ership of the work would entail a right to protect the integrity of
the work by preventing alterations. Ownership of rights to which
the work was subject-the right of publication-would not. The
stationers' copyright-the "right to the sole printing and publishing" of the work-was limited to publishers, whose concern was
not the work's integrity, but its sale.
The distinction between ownership of a work by reason of creation and ownership of the right to control the printing and publishing of a work by reason of assignment-the copyright-is made
clear by the fact that the latter remains in futuro until the work is
published. As Justice Yates wrote: "It would be strange indeed, if
the very act of publication can be deemed the commencement of
private property." 91 This distinction, however, was not merely irrelevant in the booksellers' case, it was inimical to the booksellers'
cause. If the author owned the work and merely assigned the right
to publish it, a court might hold that the rights he retained in the
work gave him unwanted control over the bookseller's right of
publication.
Mansfield skillfully conflated the rights of the author and
92
bookseller and invested copyright with the author's moral rights.
The end result was to foreclose the future development of the author's rights in his work independent of copyright because copyright preempted the field. If a copyright encompassed all the rights
in the work, the author's rights would become inextricably bound
with the publisher's rights in accordance with the publisher's
claims. Ironically, this development was detrimental, not beneficial, to the author. It eliminated the opportunity for courts to distinguish between the work and the copyright of the work.9 3 By em287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942)(sale of a painting). Cf. Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300
N.Y. 135, 89 N.E.2d 863 (1949) (Mark Twain manuscript).
91. 4 Burr at 2358, 98 Eng. Rep. at 231.
92. Mansfield's discussion of the author's rights remains a good statement of the
author's moral rights:
The author may not only be deprived of any profit, but lose the expense he has been
at. He is no more master of the use of his own name. He has no control over the
correctness of his own work. He can not prevent additions. He can not retract errors.
He can not amend; or cancel a faulty edition. Any one may print, pirate, and perpetuate the imperfections, to the disgrace and against the will of the author; may propagate
sentiments under his name, which he disapproves, repents and is ashamed of. He can
exercise no discretion as to the manner in which, or the persons by whom his work
shall be published.
Id. at 2398, 98 Eng. Rep. at 252.
93. Ironically, Justice Willes had used this distinction in his opinion: "Certainly bona
fide imitations, translations, and abridgement are different; and, in respect of the property,
may be considered as new works: but colourable and fradulent imitations will not do." Id. at
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bracing this conflation of rights, common-law jurisdictions
forfeited4 the development of the doctrine of moral rights by
default.1

The irony of this development is all the sharper because Millar was a short-lived precedent. Decided in 1769, Millar was not
appealed. The same issue and the same works, however, were
presented in 1774 to the House of Lords in Donaldson v. Becket. 5
In Donaldson the House of Lords reached a different result. Donaldson traditionally has been interpreted as holding that the author indeed did have a common-law copyright as long as the work
remained unpublished.9 6 After publication, the author had only the
rights that the Statute of Anne granted him. Professor Howard
Abrams has demonstrated ably that the House of Lords in fact did
not recognize the author's common-law copyright.9 7 The contempo2310, 98 Eng. Rep. at 205.
94. See Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947); Strauss, "The Moral
Right of the Author," in STUDIES IN COPYRIGHT 963 (Fisher ed. 1963) (Copyright Law Revision Study No. 4 (1955)); Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright
Law-A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REv. 375 (1951); Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A
Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators,53 HARV. L. REv. 554 (1940); Sarraute,
Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J.
COMP. L. 465 (1968); Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's Moral Right, 16 Am.
J. CoMP. L. 487 (1968); cf. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting, Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
95. 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (K.B. 1769); 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.
1774); 17 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. 953 (1813).
96. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664-68 (2d
Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting); M. NIMmER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.02[B] (1986); A.
LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL's COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 ACT 6 (5th
ed. 1979). A contrary view is that a majority of the judges believed that the Statute of Anne
did not preempt common-law copyright. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett. An
Inquiry Into the ConstitutionalDistributionof Powers Over the Law of Literary Property
in the United States, 9 BULL. COPYIGHT SOC. 102, 194 (1962).
That an issue as important as the existence of common-law copyright should turn on
the interpretation of one case suggests that the copyright was not recognized prior to that
case. Certainly, it suggests that any authority for the common-law copyright existing prior
to the decision was scant. Prior to 1731, when the stationers' copyrights expired under the
Statute of Anne, courts had no need, and therefore no occasion, for recognizing the common-law copyright.
Whether the Lords did or did not intend to recognize the common-law copyright, Donaldson clearly is the source of the doctrine that a work is protected by the common law as
long as it remains unpublished.
97. The House of Lords issued writs of assistance requesting the judges of King's
Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer to give their opinions on five questions formulated
by the Lords. After receiving the opinions, the Lords debated the case and voted against the
common-law copyright by a vote of twenty-two to eleven. Professor Abrams' argument is
that the confusion between the House of Lord's ruling and the judges' advisory opinions
arises from the various reports of the cases. The most commonly cited and used report contains only the judges' advisory opinions, not the text of the Lords' debate or their vote.
Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of
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rary English meaning of copyright-the sole right of printing and
publishing-supports Professor Abrams' view. The term "commonlaw copyright" was an oxymoron in 1774. What meaning could the
sole right of publishing have if the right evaporated upon publication? Thus, it is illogical to say that Donaldson recognized the author's common-law copyright unless the term is given an additional
meaning: the author's proprietary interest in his works prior to
publication. Indeed, this is what happened."" Consequently, copyright became a term with two meanings, and because the two
meanings were not distinguished for conceptual purposes, they
provided copyright with both a proprietary and a regulatory basis.
Although Donaldson is the more famous case, Millar is the
more damaging precedent because Millar combined the rights of
the author with those of the publisher.9 8 Collapsing the author's
and publisher's rights into one bundle of rights meant that copyright incorporated the author's creative function as well as the
publisher's distributive function. The author's role in creating the
work protected by copyright merged with the publisher's role in
distributing the work. Despite Donaldson's regulatory basis of
copyright, Millar's proprietary basis continued to benefit the publisher, not the author. The result was a dual conceptual basis for
copyright. After Donaldson, copyright has been known as an author's proprietary right although it continues to function as a regulatory concept.
It is reasonable to assume that the English experience, epitomized in Millar and Donaldson, caused the framers of the ConstiCommon Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1158-67 (1983).
98. "Under common-law copyright,"the property of the author ... in his intellectual
creation [was] absolute until he voluntarily part[ed] with the same.'" Harper & Row Publishers, 105 S. Ct. at 2226 (1985) (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S.
284, 299 (1907)).
99. Millar "focused future case analysis on the issue of copyright as an author's right.
In that respect, it remains a vital watershed in the development of copyright law and theory." Abrams, supra note 96, at 1156.
Millar's influence is visible in the 1976 Copyright Act, which implements the concept of
copyright as an author's right by conferring copyright protection from the moment of fixation. Ironically, this concept of fixation was necessary to make copyright available for live
television broadcasts, which are not published, but performed by transmission over the public airwaves. Thus, a broadcaster of sporting events, for example, now can obtain copyright
protection for his broadcast by videotaping the transmission of an event as it is broadcast.
Of course, the broadcaster is an author only by fiction, and the concept of fixation is not
limited to broadcasts. The concept applies to any copyrightable work fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. Thus, except for works that are not fixed, statutory copyright has
swallowed up the common-law copyright and thereby has become saddled with common-law
copyright's proprietary notions.
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tution to exclude publishers from the copyright clause. The framers' use of the Statute of Anne and their omission of publishers, on
whose conduct the concept of copyright was based, most likely reflect an intent not to give Congress the power to make a law regulating the press. In one sense, the framers' efforts were too successful. The American experience demonstrates that their design was
so subtle that it found fruition in copyright rather than free speech
doctrines.
C. The American Experience
The American copyright of the nineteenth century did not create free speech problems. 100 No problems arose partly because free
speech doctrines remained undeveloped and partly because statutory copyright required publication and, therefore, dissemination
of the copyrighted work regardless of its content.' Most impor100. The first Congress enacted a copyright statute, 1 Stat. 124, 1st Cong., 2d. Sess.,
ch. 15, that departed from the wording of the copyright clause by making copyright available to both the author and the author's assigns. One ostensible explanation for this act is
that it was based on the Statute of Anne, which did the same thing. A closer analysis of the
two acts, however, suggests that the draftsmen of the American statute were conscious of
the constitutional limitations on copyright. A comparison of the two titles indicates the differences. The title of the Statute of Anne was "An act for the encouragement of learning, by
vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the
times therein mentioned." The title of the American act was "An Act for the encouragement
of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned." The substitution of "proprietors"
in the American act for "the purchasers of copies" in the English act can be explained as
follows: The American act, unlike its English counterpart, provided that copyright was
available for the author's executors and administrators, as well as his assigns. All these persons would be "proprietors" of the copyright. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the purpose
of the copyright for assigns was to enable the author to obtain the benefit of his exclusive
right by assigning that right to a publisher. The American act, unlike the English act, was
intended subtly to deny the publisher any independent basis for copyright by reason of
owning the manuscript. From the beginning, a distinction existed between the ownership of
the work-the physical object-and of the copyright of the work-merely a series of rights
to which the work was subject. The statute's legalization of the piracy of foreign works in
section 5 indicates that the copyright rights were wholly the product of the statute. Section
5, incidentally, was based on section VII of the Statute of Anne, a provision designed to end
control over the importation of books allowed by the Licensing Act.
101. With two minor exceptions, Congress did not enact any content-based copyright,
and Congress quickly retreated from its two failed efforts.
Congress has enacted two statutory copyright restrictions that were arguably content
based, but afterwards repealed them. After the language "composition designed or
suited for public representation," which was contained in the 1856 version of the Copyright Act, Act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138, was construed in Martinette v. Maquire, 16 Fed.Cas. 920 (C.C.Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173) to mean that the moral content of
the work had to be suitable for public consumption. . . Congress deleted the "suited"
language from the next version of the Act. See Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198. A later
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tantly, however, the courts respected the implicit free speech constraints in the copyright clause.
If the copyright clause had contained explicit free speech constraints, one reasonably can assume that those constraints would
have required publication of a work as a condition for statutory
protection; precluded copyright protection for ideas or for public
documents, for example, court opinions; and permitted competitive
use of a copyrighted work under limited circumstances. Although
the copyright clause did not contain such constraints, the foregoing
doctrines nonetheless developed in the American copyright experience. All these doctrines were present or promulgated in the nineteenth century as copyright, not free speech, doctrines. In its first
copyright case, Wheaton v. Peters,10 the Supreme Court rejected
the author's common-law copyright after publication, construed
the copyright statute's requirements strictly, held that judicial
opinions could not be copyrighted, and implicitly held that ideas
were not subject to copyright. The Court made this latter doctrine
explicit almost fifty years later in Baker v. Selden.10 3 Additionally,
4 Justice Story
in Folsom v. Marsh'"
promulgated the fair use doc1
0
5
trine. These free speech doctrines masqueraded as copyright law:
publication ensured public access; the nature of court opinions required public access unfettered by private copyright; subjecting
ideas to copyright would make copyright the device of censorship
it had been under the Tudors and Stuarts; and the fair use doctrine eliminated the danger that an economic right to publish and
sell books might be used as a political right of suppression.
It is not surprising that these rules were viewed as antimonopolistic rather than pro-free speech. Censorship was considered a
version, Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 3, 18 Stat. 78, 79, contained language arguably
placing content restrictions on the copyrightability of engravings, cuts and prints. (The
Act provided that such works were copyrightable only if "connected with the fine
arts.") After this language was narrowly construed by the Supreme Court, see Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithograph Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), the language was deleted from the
1909 version of the Act, which is controlling in this case, leaving no content-based restrictions in the Act.
Mitchell Bros. Film Co. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 855 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979).
102. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). For an excellent and detailed background of the case,
see Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An InstitutionalPerspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1291 (1985).
103. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
104. 9 F. Cas. 342, No. 4901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
105. The Supreme Court recently made note of "the First Amendment protections
already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and
uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally
afforded by fair use, . . ." Harper & Row Publishers, 105 S. Ct. at 2230.
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political concern, whereas the American copyright was viewed primarily as an economic concern. As the English experience demonstrated, censorship requires three types of control. It requires control of the process (the printing press), control of the product
(licensing of the book), and control of distribution (a publishers'
cartel). None of these conditions existed in the United States.
Thus, free speech doctrines were not needed.
There was another reason that free speech doctrines did not
develop in conjunction with copyright law. During the nineteenth
century, American courts, true to the concept of copyright envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, maintained the distinction between the use of the copyright, an economic concern, and
the use of the work, a matter of learning. In deed, if not in word,
courts consistently used the distinction between the use of the
work and the use of the copyright. Baker v. Selden,106 which pre07
vented copyright from extending to ideas, and Folsom v. Marsh,1
which promulgated the fair use doctrine, clearly were predicated
on this distinction. Moreover, abridgments, which involved a use of
the work, were not considered copyright infringements. In Stowe v.
Thomas, 0 8 for example, a court held that the publication of a German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin-amost obvious use of the
work-did not infringe the copyright. In a more subtle vein, the
courts, contrary to the wording of the copyright statute, which provided the copyright owner with an exclusive right to vend the
copyrighted work, created the first sale doctrine. 0 9 This doctrine
provided that the right to vend a copy of the work was exhausted
with the first sale of that copy.
The absence of explicit free speech constraints in the copyright clause itself, combined with the lack of judicial need to use
free speech doctrines, has allowed the idea that the copyright
clause imposes free speech constraints on Congress to remain dormant. The time has come to reassert that idea." 0 The 1976 Copy106. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
107. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
108. 23 F. Cas. 201 (E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
109. See, e.g., Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894); Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961). The doctrine is codified in the 1976
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 109. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (ownership of copyright is distinct from ownership
of material object).
110. Commentators recently have raised the copyright/free speech issue, but not in the
terms suggested here. See Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REv. 283 (1979); Goldstein, Copyright and
the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the
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right Act, in applying copyright to new communications technology, has forfeited the major free speech safeguard implicit in
copyright-the requirement of publication. Prior to the 1976 Act,
however, the relevance of free speech constraints to copyright had
been undermined by three related developments: (1) the growth of
the notion that a copyright is private property; (2) the unwitting
expansion of copyright in the 1909 Copyright Revision Act; and (3)
the corruption of the fair use doctrine, a direct result of the second
development.
III.

COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE

A.

Overview

Of the three free speech constraints implicit in copyright-publication, no copyright for ideas or governmental works,
and fair use-the last is the most important and far reaching.
Eliminate the others, and a rational fair use doctrine can protect
the rights of free speech. As it currently exists, however, the fair
use doctrine is irrational. The most important free speech constraint implicit in copyright, therefore, is the least efficacious.
The tangled web of reasons for this state of affairs leads ultimately to the failure to recognize the free speech limitations in the
copyright clause. Courts aware of these limitations would have
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
Courts consistently have rejected the free speech defense in copyright infringement actions. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184
(5th Cir. 1979); Roy Export Co. Estab. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 672 F.2d
1095 (2d Cir. 1982); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,
558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977); Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1978). One district court upheld the free speech defense, Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), but on appeal, the Court
of Appeals rejected the free speech defense and affirmed on fair use grounds, 626 F.2d 1171
(5th Cir. 1980).
In general, these cases were sound in rejecting the free speech defense as being the last
refuge of an infringing scoundrel. The denigration of the defense caused by its use by blatant infringers, however, should not be allowed to obscure its importance in an appropriate
case. Furthermore, courts should not be beguiled by Nimmer's solution that because copyright does not protect ideas, it cannot infringe free speech rights. The Supreme Court has
accepted the notion that the idea/expression dichotomy is a sound basis for reconciling
copyright and free speech rights. "The Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's
idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment
and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author's expression.'" Harper& Row Publishers,105 S. Ct. at 2228-29. This approach, however, overlooks the essential problem created by the application of copyright to new technology: the copyright owner's control of access to the expression of the idea.
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avoided the confusion over the nature of copyright as proprietary
or regulatory in nature; Congress' unwitting expansion of copyright
in the 1909 Act would not have occurred; and without this expansion courts would have had no basis to corrupt the fair use doctrine. Consequently, the application of copyright to new communications technology would have been made in light of the threat
that copyright poses for free speech rights. These statements, of
course, are statements of probabilities, for reason could have
faltered anywhere along the way. But if we assume sound reason,
the probabilities are high. To demonstrate the point, we focus here
in detail on the fair use doctrine, with a brief preliminary explanation of the thesis.
As originally promulgated, the fair use doctrine was a fair
"competitive" use doctrine designed to enable a rival author or
publisher to use a copyrighted work in preparing another publication. Therefore, the doctrine applied only to competitors, not consumers. When Congress enlarged the copyright owner's rights in
the 1909 Copyright Revision Act to encompass the right to copy, as
well as the rights to print, reprint, publish, and vend the copyrighted work, it enlarged the copyright owner's domain and
brought consumer conduct within the realm of infringement.
Before the 1909 Act, the consumer's use of a copyrighted work was
merely an ordinary use, neither fair nor unfair, and was irrelevant
to copyright infringement actions. Thus, after the 1909 Act, the
notion that the judicially created doctrine of fair use would protect
the consumer's right of access was illusory because saying that a
use may be fair is saying also that it may be unfair. Courts applying the 1909 Act thus reduced the three uses of copyrighted
work-unfair use by a competitor (infringement), fair use by a
competitor (no infringement), and ordinary use by a consumer (no
issue raised)-to two-unfair use and fair use. The chilling effect
that the new act had on the constitutional purpose of copyright-the promotion of learning-was subtle, but consequential.
The principle the 1909 Act established was the beginning of a
termitic infestation of the constitutional right of free speech.
B.

The Origin of the Fair Use Doctrine

In 1841 Joseph Story formulated the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh,"' a case involving two publishers of George Washington biographies. Because an understanding of the original fair
111.

9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass 1841) (No. 4901).
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use doctrine requires an awareness of the copyright owner's rights
at the time the doctrine was created, it is important to note that
the copyright statute involved in Folsom was the Revision Act of
1831.112 The relevant rights in that statute, however, were the same
as those in the 1790 Act."' Under both acts, the owner of a book's
copyright had the right to print, reprint, publish, and vend the
copyrighted work.
In Folsom the plaintiff's author, Jared Sparks, had published
a twelve volume work entitled The Writings of George Washington. The defendant's author, the Reverend Charles W. Upham,
had published a two volume work entitled The Life of Washington
in the form of an Autobiography. Upham's work derived 353 of its
866 pages from letters and other documents that had appeared in
the 7000 pages of Sparks' work. The court held that Washington's
letters were subject to copyright and rejected the defendant's defense that his work was an abridgment, which at that time was not
deemed an infringement. The copying in Folsom, however, involved printing and publishing by a competitor. The court held
that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's copyright. In
reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
The question, then, is whether this is a justifiable use of the original materials, such as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the
plaintiffs .... In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort,

look to the nature and object of the selections made [by a competitor], the
quantity and or value of the materials used [by a competitor], and the degree
in which the use [by a competitor] may prejudice the11sale, or diminish the
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work. '

The editorial addition of the bracketed "by a competitor" language is intended to make the following point: The fair use doctrine, as originally promulgated, was a fair "competitive" use doctrine predicated on a distinction between the use of the work and
the use of the copyright. Using the work could be fair, using the
copyright could not. The key issue was whether the use of the work
had become a use of the copyright. As Eaton Drone stated in his
nineteenth century classic on copyright law: "It is a recognized
principle that every author, compiler or publisher may make certain uses of a copyrighted work, in'the preparation of a rival or
other publication."" 5 Because a consumer would not use the work
112.
113.
114.
115.

Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
See supra note 33.
9 F. Cas. at 348.
E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL

PRODUCTIONs

386 (1870).
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in the preparation of a rival or other publication, the fair use doctrine had no relevance to the consumer's use of the work.
The consumer's absence from the fair use equation was not
coincidental. Copyright infringement involved the competitive use
of a copyrighted work and was viewed as an act of piracy.11 A consumer's use of the work, of course, was not an act of piracy unless
it became competitive in nature.
To appreciate why the consumer did not fall within the realm
of the fair use doctrine, it is helpful to note that the development
of the doctrine was closely allied to the doctrine that the abridgment of a copyrighted work was not an infringement. In Folsom
Story acknowledged that "a fair and bona fide abridgement of an
original work, is not a piracy of the copyright of the author." 11
Story and American courts in general, however, did not like the
doctrine. 18 In Gray v. Russell'1 9 Story made substantially the
same points regarding fair abridgment as he would make two years
later in Folsom.2 0 In Folsom Story, notwithstanding his enunciation of the fair use doctrine, held that the defendant's work was a
piratical use. Story explained this result near the end of his opinion: "If it had been the case of a fair and bona fide abridgement of
the work of the plaintiffs it might have admitted of a very different
12 1
consideration.
116. Thus Folsom was a "Bill in equity for piracy of the copyright of the writings of
Washington." 9 F. Cas. at 343. "In the law of copyright, piracy is the use of literary property

in violation of the rights of the owner. The meaning of infringement is the same." E. DRONE,
supra note 115, at 383.
117. 9 F. Cas. at 345.
118. See E. DRONE, supra note 115, at 434-35. For example, in a case which turned on

the question of abridgment, Justice M'Lean would have ruled for the author: "But a contrary doctrine has been long established in England, under the statute of Anne, which, in
this respect, is similar to our own statute; and in this country the same doctrine has prevailed. I am, therefore, bound by precedent; and I yield to it in this instance, more as a
principle of law, than a rule of reason or justice." Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173

(C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,479).
119. 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728).
120.
The question, in such a case [abridgment of an original work], must be compounded of
various considerations; whether it be a bona fide abridgment, or only an evasion by the
omission of some unimportant parts; whether it will, in its present form, prejudice or
supersede the original work; whether it will be adapted to the same class of readers;
and many other considerations of the same sort, which may enter as elements, in ascertaining, whether there has been piracy or not. Although the doctrine is often laid down
in the books, that an abridgment is not a piracy of the original copyright; yet this
proposition must be received with many qualifications.
Id. at 1038.
121. 9 F. Cas. at 349.
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Given that a bona fide abridgment of a copyrighted work was
not considered an infringement, Story could not summarily hold
that the defendant's use was piratical. Instead, he did the next
best thing by narrowing the principles applicable to abridgment
and making those principles applicable to a use of the copyrighted
work generally. He repeated in Folsom what he had said in Gray
and, without acknowledging it, reinforced his earlier narrowing of
the fair abridgment doctrine. The result of Story's opinion in Folsom was to enlarge protection for the copyright owner.
Although providing authors with greater protection against
predatory competitive practices is commendable, extending the
fair use doctrine to protect the author against a consumer's ordinary use of the work demonstrates that Drone was correct when he
wrote: "The judicial history of copyright is fertile in examples
showing how false doctrines become firmly rooted in jurisprudence
by the practice of blindly following precedents without examining
122
the precedents on which they are based.
C.

The Corruptionof the Fair Use Doctrine

Today, the fair use doctrine is no longer competitive in nature.
The doctrine is applied to consumers as well as competitors.1 23 A
fair use doctrine intended to permit competitors to make reasonable use of a work is quite different from a fair use doctrine that
makes a consumer's use of the work for ordinary purposes suspect.
The fair use doctrine, therefore, has been separated from its foundations and has become a free floating doctrine of "equitable reason," 124 with all the confusion that a doctrine of equitable reason
entails. The confusion began with the 1909 Copyright Revision
Act."2 5 The confusion's source was the Act's addition of the right to
copy to the copyright owner's exclusive rights, an error that eventually tilted the foundations of copyright law away from its public
purpose to the cause of private gain.
Prior to the 1909 Copyright Act, copyright statutes contained
122. E. DRONE, supra note 115, at 434.

123. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the
issue was whether the use of the copyrighted works-videotaping copyrighted motion pictures off-the-air-was a fair use. Justice Blackmun made my point in his dissent: "I am
aware of no case in which the reproduction of a copyrighted work for the sole benefit of the
user has been held to be fair use." 464 U.S. at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124. H.R. RaP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659.
125. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075-88; 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976).
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a specification-of-rights section and a specification-of-infringement
section. The latter distinguished the infringement of books from
the infringement of other types of works, such as maps, charts,
prints, engravings, and statuary. 26 In general, printing a book and
copying other kinds of works were infringements.1 2 7 The specification-of-rights section, as distinguished from the specification-of-infringement section, was continued in the 1870 Copyright Revision
Act,' s the second major revision of the copyright law, and assumed
considerable importance because of the increased scope of copyright coverage. The relevant section read:
[A]ny citizen of the United States, or resident therein, who shall be the author, inventor, designer, or proprietor of any book, map, chart, dramatic or
musical composition, engraving, cut, print, or photograph or negative thereof,
or of a painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs
intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts... shall... have the sole
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending the same ....129

For the first time, the right to copy was associated with books,
but the infringement sections of the 1870 Act130 made clear that
the right to copy did not apply to books. 1 3 1 Congress, in the 1909
Act, overlooked this point and defined both the copyright owner's
rights and the rights "[t]o print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend
the copyrighted work . ..,13 and eliminated the specification-ofinfringement section. 3 8 The rights to print, reprint, publish, copy,
and vend were made applicable to all copyrighted works. The Congress was justified in including the right to copy because the statute protected works for which the only appropriate protection was
the right to copy. Congress, however, did not recognize the consequences of the statutory change. The Committee Report on the bill
126.

See V. CLAPP, COPYRIGHT-A LIBRARIAN'S VIEw 28 (1968).

127. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd
per curiam, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (Court equally divided).
128. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (codified and reenacted in 1873-74

as §§ 4948-71 of the Revised Statutes).
129.

§ 86, 16 Stat. at 212.

130. §§ 99 (infringement of books), 100 (infringement of other works), 16 Stat. at 214.
131. The statute ... makes a distinction between infringement of a book and of
cut, engraving, etc. A book is infringed by printing, publishing, importing, selling, or
exposing for sale any copy of the book. Section 4964, Rev. St. A chart, print, cut, engraving, etc., is infringed by engraving, etching, working, copying, printing, publishing,
importing, selling, or exposing for the sale a copy of the chart, cut, etc. Section 4965.
Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519, 520 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1886).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1976).
133. "If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable .... ." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
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"stated incorrectly that the draft reproduced without change the
phraseology of the Revised statutes, but stated correctly that 'this,
with the insertion of the word "copy", practically adopts the phraseology of the first copyright act Congress ever passed-that of
1790.' ,,3" This language suggests that Congress did not intend to
change significantly the scope of copyright protection.
"[C]opyright proprietors, without seeking it and apparently quite
by accident, acquired at least the semblance of a right to an activity that was to have increasing importance in the new century."'' 5
Congress had no reason to apply the right to copy to books already
protected adequately by the rights to print, reprint, publish, and
vend.
The new right to copy for the first time gave a book's copyright owner a right as to books that a consumer of the work historically could properly exercise, 36 but did not deny the consumer the
continued right of exercise. Therefore, the new right created an ostensible dilemma. Courts might be forced to choose between two
rights: the copyright owner's right to copy the work and the consumer's right to use the work in a way that involved copying. Yet
the dilemma was not recognized, partly because of the courts' proprietary bias. The main reason the dilemma was not recognized,
however, was that most copyright infringement actions were
brought against competitors who unfairly used the copyright. In
such cases, the fair use defense was rejected properly.
If the courts had perceived the dilemma, they could have
avoided it easily by recognizing that the right to copy was, in fact,
the right to copy and vend. This interpretation, however, was
never given to the statute. Moreover, the fair use doctrine as codified in the 1976 Copyright Act' 7 suggests that courts are not likely
134.
(1909)).

V.

CLAPP,

supra note 127, at 27 (quoting HR. REP. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4

135. Id.
136. [T]he effect of a copyright is not to prevent any reasonable use of the book
which is sold. I go to a book-store, and I buy a book which has been copyrighted. I may
use that book for reference, study, reading, lending, copying passages from it at my
will. I may not duplicate that book, and thus put in upon the market, for in so doing I
would infringe the copyright.
Stover v. Lathrop, 33 F. 348, 349 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888). "[T]he author's exclusive property in
a literary composition or his copyright, consists only in a right to multiply copies of his
book, and enjoy the profits therefrom, and not in an exclusive right to his conceptions
....
Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
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to interpret the statute this way in the future. section 107 of the
1976 Copyright Act lists four factors that courts should consider in
determining whether a particular use is fair: (1) the nature of the
use; (2) the nature of the work; (3) the amount used; and (4) the
economic effect. 138
The Act defines the nature of the use more specifically as "the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."'13 9
Three of the four factors listed in section 107-the nature of the
work, the amount used, and the economic effect-also are found in
Folsom. 40 The nature of the use, however, is not. 4 1 This factor
clearly brings the using consumer under the umbrella of fair use
and eliminates any basis for distinguishing between the using consumer and the using competitor.
To make the type of use a factor in determining whether a
particular use is fair without distinguishing between types of users,
as the 1976 Act did, is to treat copyright as property and to give
the copyright owner control over the learning function of copyspecified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
138. See id.
139. Id. § 107(1).
140. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). See supra text accompanying notes
111-14.
141. "Section 107 departs materially from the Folsom criteria only in the first statutory factor, which is '[t]he purpose of and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.'" Raskind, A Functional
Interpretationof Fair Use, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. 601, 606 (1984).
Patry says that the factor of "the nature and objects of the selections made" was "as
slightly rephrased" adopted in section 107 of the 1976 Act as the first fair use factor. W.
PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (1985). This conclusion, however,
does not stand up under analysis. The words "nature and objects" refer to the selections
taken, not to their use. In other words, they refer to the nature of the work (the second fair
use factor in section 107) and not the use of the work. Recall that at that time, the copyright
owner had only the rights "to print, reprint, publish and vend" the copyrighted work. In
1841, the use was by definition a commercial use. Note also that two years earlier, in Gray v.
Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728), Story made essentially the
same points in regard to abridgments; clearly a commercial use.
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right, because the failure to make a distinction between users implies that there is no distinction between the use of the work and
the use of the copyright. Therefore, although three types of uses
may be made of a copyrighted work-an unfair use, a fair use, and
an ordinary use-the failure to distinguish between the use of the
work and the use of the copyright results in the conclusion that
there are only two types of use-unfair and fair. Thus, when the
copyright owner's rights were enlarged to include the right to copy,
it followed that any copying of a work would be either a fair or
unfair use, whether the use was by a competitor or a consumer.
Unfair and fair use, however, should apply only to the use of the
copyright, not the use of the work. The refusal to accept this conclusion meant that the fair use doctrine would be used to protect
the owner's copyright from the consumer by treating the consumer
as a competitor, even though the fair use doctrine was intended to
limit the copyright monopoly. 142 Courts assumed, apparently without analyzing the problem, that the doctrine of fair use applied 14to3
the consumer's as well as the competitor's copying of the work.
Thus, fair use now applies to the use of the work for learning purposes as well as the use of the copyright for competitive purposes.
The result of these developments is confusion regarding the
scope and nature of fair use.14 4 This confusion has been generated
142. The source of the problem, of course, is that copyright as property is a property
of joint use that is not consumed with the use. The value of a book's copyright depends
upon the number of persons who will purchase the book, and an infinite number can
purchase the book. Printing a book does not destroy its value. In fact, it may enhance the
book for printing by another. Because a consumer can "copy" a book purchased by another
and thereby deprive the copyright owner of a sale, courts deemed it necessary to protect
"the monopoly" from the consumer. The application of traditional market principles to a
nontraditional property thus tends to defeat the purpose of the law that gives the property
existence-the promotion of learning. Copyright's nontraditional nature is the basis of the
justification for treating copyright as a regulatory concept.
143. See, e.g., Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
144. Is fair use an infringement of copyright that is excused, or is it not an infringement? The Copyright Act states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . isnot an
infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107. Commentators have provided various definitions of fair use, for example: "a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright, to use
the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent; notwithstanding the
monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944); and "a use technically forbidden by the law, but allowed as
reasonable and customary, on the theory that the author must have forseen it and tacitly
consented to it." R. DEWOLF. AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925), quoted in Choen,
Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 45 (1955). See Marsh,
Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards to Apply, 5 CARD. L. REV. 635,
643 (1984). "A part of the difficulty in comprehending the limits of fair use would appear to
lie in the broad and to some extent contradictory manner in which the courts defined the

1987]

FREE SPEECH AND COPYRIGHT

largely by the ease of photocopying materials and has obscured the
point that fair use "has always had to do with the use by a second
author of a first author's work.' 1 45 Consequently, fair use analysis
traditionally was directed to competitors' actions. "Fair use has
not heretofore had to do with the mere reproduction of a work in
order to use it for its intrinsic purpose-to make what might be
called the 'ordinary' use of it.' l4 This statement is sound, but the
inference drawn from it is not. The author goes on to say, "[w]hen
copies are made for the work's 'ordinary' purpose,
ordinary in47
triggered.'
been
customarily
has
fringement
This statement's fallacy is its assumption that the use of a
copyrighted work always involves one of two kinds of uses, fair and
unfair. This is simply not so. The points this assumption overlooks
are that copyrighted works may be used in any one of three
ways-unfairly, fairly, and ordinarily-and that an ordinary use
creates no copyright issue.'4 8 Prior to the 1909 Act, the consumer's
use was neither fair nor unfair; it was merely ordinary.' 4 The noconcept prior to codification in the current Act." M. NMMER, supra note 96, at 13-63 (1986).
Nimmer does not attempt to define fair use and treats it as merely a matter of defense in
infringement actions. If, as the Copyright Act provides, 17 U.S.C. § 107, fair use is not an
infringement, however, fair use has a purpose other than serving as a defense in infringement actions.
145. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1968).
146. Id.
147. Id. If ordinary use had been relevant to the fair use doctrine, Drone surely would
have discussed it, because his bias was clearly in favor of protecting the rights of the author.
His test for fair use, therefore, is instructive:
The general test for determining whether a fair or a piratical use has been made of one
work in the preparation of another will be, whether the later one or the part in question is the result of independent labor, or is substantially copied from the earlier one
....
It is true that a subsequent author, keeping within the letter of the law defining
fair use, will often avail himself to no small extent of the industry and learning of
another, and give to his own book a value which properly belongs elsewhere. In other
words, a fair use in law may in ethics amount to plagiarism. But this cannot well be
avoided.
E. DRONE, supra note 115, at 398-99.
148.
[Tjhe effect of a copyright is not to prevent any reasonable use of the book which is
sold. I go to a book-store, and I buy a book which has been copyrighted. I may use that
book for reference, study, reading, lending, copying passages from it at my will. I may
not duplicate that book, and thus put it upon the market, for in so doing I would
infringe the copyright.
Stover v. Lathrop, 33 F. 348, 349 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888).
149. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), is so at odds with this point that it merits comment. Justice Blackmun expressed the view that fair use generally is limited to productive uses by another
scholar, in which case "the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy." 464 U.S. at 478
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). The view that fair use requires a productive use leads naturally
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tion that an individual consumer's ordinary use of a work, as by
copying it, constitutes infringement is not just nonsense, it is dangerous nonsense that is wholly contrary to the constitutional purpose of copyright. 150
to the conclusion that "when a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its original
purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use usually does not apply.
There is then no need whatsoever to provide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the
author's expense." 464 U.S. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
This passage raises three points: First, while fair use may be a subsidy, one can argue
just as plausibly that copyright is "a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to

writers." T. MACAULAY,

SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT

25 (C. Gaston ed. 1914). Second, prohibiting

a user from reproducing the work for its original purpose gives the work's particular purpose
precedence over the general purpose of copyright-the promotion of learning. Third, the
phrase "with no added benefit to the public" ignores that the user is the public. The constitutional purpose of copyright can be fulfilled only through individual users.
It should be noted that the "productive use" requirement of the fair use doctrine almost surely is inherited from the doctrine of fair abridgment. A fair abridgment would entail effort on the part of the second author and thus be a "productive use" of the work. See
Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (No. 5728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839); E. DRONE, supra note
115, at 158 ("there must be substantial and valuable fruit of authorship on the part of the
maker"). Thus, it is logical to infer that when the issue became "fair use" instead of fair
abridgment, the productive use requirement continued. The result would have been sound if
the fair use doctrine had remained competitive in nature, but the productive use requirement makes little sense when applied to the consumer. The majority in Sony was justified in
rejecting the "productive use" requirement for fair use.
The distressing point about this passage, however, is that it implies that copyright is
private property vested with no public interest. If this is so, the result that the framers
sought to avoid in the copyright and free speech clauses-congressional power over the
press-has been achieved, because Congress has, in effect, made the press an author. More
importantly, the Court has said that Congress may attach to its grant of copyright whatever
conditions and restrictions it sees fit. United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208
U.S. 260, 264 (1908).
150. The ultimate issue is whether the copyright clause requires that the right of public access to publicly disseminated copyrighted material be respected during the term of the
copyright. The Supreme Court has not analyzed this issue very well. In Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), for example, Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, noted that copyright "is intended to motivate the creative activity
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to all the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Id.
at 429. In dissent, Justice Blackmun noted: "Copyright gives the author a right to limit
access or even to cut off access to his work." Id. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
This last statement is astounding when considered in light of the meaning of copyright
in 1787--"the sole printing and publishing of a work"-which by its nature insured public
access. The fallacy of both Justice Stevens' and Justice Blackmun's statements is their failure to recognize that copyright has both a purpose and a function. The purpose is to promote learning; the function is to protect the author's economic interest. The function, however, must serve the purpose, not vice versa. To say that the copyright owner has a right to
the profit and a right to deny public access is to fly in the face of the constitutional scheme
of copyright. The purpose of copyright relates to the use of the work; the function of copyright relates to the use of the copyright. In order to protect the author against the use of the
copyright, it is not necessary to deny the consumer the use of the work.
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Congress further confused this issue by focusing on the problem of consumer copying in both section 107 and section 108 of the
1976 Copyright Act, which ensured that ordinary use, and thus the
consumer, would remain within the compass of the fair use doctrine. 1 51 A fair use doctrine that is applied to consumer use of the
work-the learning function-inhibits rather than promotes learning. It enlarges the concept of infringement at the expense of the
individual consumer's right to copy the work for purposes of
1 52
learning.
The fact that an individual user is not likely to be subjected to
an infringement action for copying one article is irrelevant. The
point is that the infringement claim has a reasonable basis and
could succeed. The legitimacy of this claim legitimizes the right to
use copyright to create, rather than merely protect, the profit to be
gained from a work. 153 Thus, because the fair use doctrine has been
expanded to encompass the learning function of copyright, it can
be and has been used to expand the copyright owner's right to con54
trol access to the copyrighted work.1
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1976). Notwithstanding the educational purpose enumerated
in its codification of the fair use doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107, Congress included in the House
Report an Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational
Institutions, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 68-70 (1976). This agreement properly can be characterized as restrictive. For an early example of a court's negative reaction
to the use of educational materials, see Macmillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (1914) (private
economics tutor not protected by fair use in preparing 32 outlines of a work for students
required to possess a copy of the work).
152. Thus, if an individual photocopies a copyrighted article, his use of the article can
be characterized theoretically as an ordinary use, a fair use, or an unfair use. If copying is
per se an exclusive right of the copyright owner, the individual's copying cannot be an ordinary use. Therefore, it must be either a fair or unfair use. This means that the individual
user is always subject to a charge of copyright infringement, and the burden of proving no
infringement has occurred will be on him.
153. As the Supreme Court noted in Sony, "the natural tendency of legal rights to
express themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all else is particularly pronounced
in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned monopolies of the copyright and the patent." Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 n.13 (1983).
Publications today frequently contain a legend that the work may be copied for fifty
cents per page. The following comment from The Copyright Law Journal is revealing:
Readers have expressed interest in the question of permissible photocopying of our
newsletter. The short answer is that Section 108 prohibits related or concerted reproduction of multiple copies of the same material. In addition, the legislative history
states, as a general principle, that the scope of fair use should be considerably narrower
in the case of newsletters than in the case of other periodicals. In response to this
situation, therefore, we are now offering a discount to our subscribers on all multiple
copies. The rate for each additional subscription is $100.
I THE COPYRIGHT LAW JOURNAL 60 (1984).
154. The defect of the "nature of the use" factor contains its own remedy. The nature
of the use should be construed to refer to the use of the copyright, not the work. The refer-
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There is a paradox here. In 1841, and up until the 1909 Act,
fair use was a minor adjunct to copyright law. Fair use was a fair
"competitive" use not by design, but because of copyright's limited
scope, which gave the copyright owner no right to control the use
of the work once it was published, except against a competitor.
The public benefit derived from the fair use doctrine in terms of
the promotion of learning was minimal. Once the book was on the
library shelf, public access was assured and the public needed no
fair use protection. The paradox is that today the copyright
owner's right to control access to the work far exceeds what could
have been imagined in 1841, and the fair use doctrine is being used
to enhance that control even further. The growth of the idea that
copyright is a property right vested with little or no public interest
is an important factor in this development.

IV.

THE GROWTH OF THE NOTION OF COPYRIGHT AS PRIVATE
PROPERTY

The 1909 Copyright Act marked a turning point in American
copyright law. Congress passed the Act at the beginning of a new
era of technology and, in attempting to accommodate copyright to
the new technology of mechanical recordings, devised a compulsory
recording license for musical compositions 55 in order to provide
copyright protection and to prevent the monopolization of the recording industry. Except for photographs, which were given copyright protection in 1865156 and which took the form of prints,
mechanical sound recordings were the first products of new technology protected by copyright since the printing press gave rise to
the need for such protection.
More significantly, however, the 1909 Act abolished the doctrine that abridgments and translations did not constitute copyright infringements. 157 Although many believed that this change
righted an injustice to authors, it was directed only to competitive
uses of copyrighted works. With the exception of one other change,
the 1909 Act maintained the unarticulated distinction between the
ence in section 107 to the "fair use of a copyrighted work" is no impediment to this interpretation because the use of the copyright entails the use of the work. This interpretation
excludes the consumer from the umbrella of fair use and gives the other fair use factors a
coherence when applied to a competitor's use of the copyright. A consumer who uses the
copyright, of course, ceases to be a consumer and becomes a competitor.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1976).

156. 8 Stat. 540-41.
157.

17 U.S.C. § 1(b) (1976).
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use of the copyright and the use of the work. That other change
added the right to copy literary works to the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner.
Congress' expansion of copyright by this latter change was an
unwitting, but almost inevitable result of a continuing course of
development set in motion by Wheaton v. Peters.158 "The core of
[Wheaton's] doctrine-that copyright is a statutory grant for the
benefit of the author, which can be secured only by strict compliance with statutory requirements-remains fundamental to the
copyright law of the United States to the present day." 159 Wheaton, however, had two faults: its premise was too broad and its
holding was too narrow. Wheaton's premise was that the Court
was dealing with the "literary property of authors." Its holding was
that copyright is a statutory monopoly to be strictly construed.
Wheaton's faults can be traced to Millar v. Taylor,160 which
was far more influential on Wheaton than was Donaldson v. Beckett.'61 Without recognizing the difference between Millar and
Wheaton, M'Lean's majority opinion in Wheaton relied heavily on
Yeates' dissent in Millar, while Thompson's dissenting opinion in
Wheaton was devoted largely to refuting Yeates' dissent. The difference between the two cases was that in Millar the King's Bench
dealt with copyright in a technical sense as the right to the sole
printing and publishing of a work, whereas in Wheaton the Court
treated copyright as the author's literary property. Given Mansfield's dictum in Millar, which incorporated the author's rights
into copyright, M'Lean's characterization of the problem as one of
the "author's literary property" is understandable but unfortunate.
This characterization foreclosed the theoretical distinction between
the work and the copyright of the work.
Wheaton's rigid holding, that copyright is the author's statutory monopoly and should be strictly construed, had two effects.
First, the author suffered because of a rigid construction of copyright. Second, Congress inevitably acted to remedy the inequities
created by Wheaton's holding by enlarging copyright statutorily.162
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
Joyce, supra note 102, at 1291-92.
4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
4 Burr. 2407, 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 17 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. Eng. 953 (H.L. 1774).
"By many amendments, and by complete revision in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976,

authors' rights have been expanded to provide protection to any 'original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,' including 'motion pictures and other audiovisual works.' 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)." Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 460-61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The revisions of the copyright statute were
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This constant growth of rights led inevitably to the notion of copyright as property despite its regulatory function.
The premier example of the effect that rigid construction of
the copyright statute had on the author is Stowe v. Thomas.16 3 In
Stowe the court held a German translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin
not to be an infringement of copyright.16 4 This result was manifestly unjust. It was this type of unjust result that led Congress to
enlarge the scope of copyright. The 1909 Act, for example, gave the
copyright owner, not the author per se, the right to translate copyrighted works.16 5 This development ultimately led, in the 1976
Act, 6 8 to the right to prepare derivative works generally. More
harmful to the author was the loss of copyright for gossamer reasons-the improper notice or lack of notice-which were almost
67
surely the publisher's fault.
If copyright had not been construed to encompass the author's
entire rights, a feasible solution based on the distinction between
the use of the work and the use of the copyright would have been
apparent. Publishing a translation of an author's work would have
been a use of the work, but not of the copyright. The publisher
could not have complained, and the publication could not have
been prevented. The author, however, could have been entitled to
royalties. 16 8 The loss of copyright by lack of notice could have permitted competitive publication, but only if the competitor paid the
author royalties during the copyright's statutory term. Ironically,
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, §§ 85-111, 16 Stat. 212-17; Act of
March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (formerly codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976); Copyright
Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-809 (1982). The reference to "authors'
rights" exemplifies the ingrained nature of the notion that copyright is an authors' right,
even in a case in which the "authors" of the works in issue-motion pictures-were corporations and were "authors" only by grace of the work for hire doctrine, which is a manifest
fiction. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
163. 23 F. Cas. 201, (E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
164. The holding in Stowe was consistent with copyright doctrine at that time. "A
man has a right to a copy-right in a translation, upon which he has bestowed his time and
labor. To be sure, another man has an equal right to translate the original work, and to
publish his translation; but then it must be his own translation by his own skill and labor;
and not the mere use and publication of the translation already made by another." Emerson
v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
165. 17.U.S.C. § 1(b) (1976).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
167. See, e.g., Mifflin v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903); Holmes v. Hurst, 174
U.S. 82 (1899).
168. "In the nineteenth century American publishers sold countless copies of British
works and paid their authors royalties despite the fact that American copyright law did not
protect British works." Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 282-83 (1970).
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Thompson's dissent in Wheaton contains a passage that implies
such a solution. Near the end of his dissenting opinion, he wrote:
"The term for which the copyright is secured in the case now
before the court, has not expired; and according to the admitted
and settled doctrine in England, under the Statute of Anne, the
common-law remedy exists during that period."' 9
Thompson implied a basis for protecting the author's rights
independently from those of the publisher, by distinguishing the
use of the work from the use of the copyright. This solution was
wholly consistent with the copyright clause because it would have
provided protection for the author, but not necessarily for the publisher. Wheaton, however, foreclosed this solution by making the
publisher the invisible actor in the copyright drama. Because the
publisher was an invisible actor and because he was the source of
the monopoly problem, he had to be reached through the author.
Because of Wheaton, publishers in the United States continued, as in eighteenth century England, to use the author as a foil
to enlarge the rights of copyright owners. 170 Expanding copyright
to protect the author's property, however, benefited the entrepreneur more than the author. The expansion continued until the entrepreneur was treated, under the guise of the work for hire doctrine, on a par with the author.
The work for hire doctrine was incorporated into the 1909
Copyright Act. Section 26 of the Act provided that "the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire,"
and section 24 provided that in the case of "any work copyrighted
. . .by an employer for whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal." Congress
7
justified inclusion of the doctrine on the basis of expediency.1 '
Although doubts about the work for hire doctrine's constitu169. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 698 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
170. Indeed, the concern of Wheaton's publisher over Peter's proposal for his Condensed Reports, although Wheaton himself was in Denmark, demonstrates the active role of
publishers in copyright litigation. See Joyce, supra note 102, at 1367-70.
171.
In the case of composite or cyclopaedic works, to which a great many authors contribute for hire and upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor of
the work, it was felt that the proprietor of such work should have the exclusive right to
apply for the renewal term. In some cases the contributors to such a work might number hundreds and be scattered over the world, and it would be impossible for the proprietor of the work to secure their application in applying for renewal.
H.R. REP. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1909). The report makes no mention of the substantive provision making the change.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

tionality were expressed, 17 2 its constitutionality was never passed
upon. 17 The doctrine was carried forward into the 1976 Act, 174 ap7 5
parently without consideration of its constitutional implications.
The late Professor Nimmer, the leading authority on copyright, defended the constitutionality of the work for hire doctrine by saying
that "Congress has in effect created an implied assignment of
rights from the employee-author to his employer-in the absence
1' 6
of an express agreement to the contrary."'
Professor Nimmer, however, recognized that the doctrine is a
legal fiction. "The fiction of the employer as author was employed
. . .not in order to achieve substantive results that could not have
been otherwise achieved, but rather because of the 'convenience
and simplicity' of this manner of achieving such results.' ' 7 7 The
method chosen, however, does have substantive results; it effectively makes the entrepreneur an author. The justification for this
result is that copyright is property. "The author's property right
derived from the Constitutional authority is unquestionably assignable.' 7 This statement makes my point: the notion of copyright as property serves as the basis for the continued expansion of
copyright to the benefit of the entrepreneur. The point overlooked
is that it is not the author's property rights but his regulatory
rights that are derived from "the constitutional authority."
Congress, therefore, accomplished by fiction what the framers
of the Constitution avoided: a copyright for publishers and entrepreneurs that exists independently of assignment from the author.
Prior to the 1909 Act, courts deemed copyright to be a statutory
monopoly and therefore regulatory in nature. After the 1909 Act,
the monopoly concerns of copyright were subordinated to the notion that copyright was merely property to be protected as any
other property right.
172. See Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly,
J., dissenting).
173. M. NIMMER, supra note 96, at 1-39.
174. 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 101 (defining "work made for hire").
175. The study made for Congress in connection with the revision of copyright and the
work for hire doctrine does not mention the copyright clause. B. Varmer, Study No. 13,
Works Made for Hire and on Commission, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITrEE ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 68th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960).
176. M. NIMMER, supra note 96, at 1-40.
177. Id. at 1-41.
178. Id. at 1-38.
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COPYRIGHT GONE ASTRAY: THE CAUSE AND THE REMEDY

American copyright law has gone astray. The 1976 Copyright
Act's most striking aspect is the extent to which it uses fictions to
circumvent the constitutional limits on Congress' power to grant
copyright. The copyright clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to secure only to authors the exclusive right only to their
writings, only for limited times, and only to promote learning. The
core of copyright doctrine, therefore, consists of three elements:
author, writings, and publication. A fourth element, creativity or
originality, is included because copyright is available only for new
works. The 1976 Copyright Act accommodates all these elements
by fictions.
The 1976 Act gives copyright to all works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression,'17 9 a phrase clearly intended
to reach beyond writings. The Act continues to embellish the doctrine that an employer, most often a corporate entity, is the author
of an employee's creations. 180 It treats a work televised to millions
as performed, not published, and it treats a pamphlet placed on
sale, although ignored by potential purchasers, as published.' A
live television broadcast of an event, whether of a burning building
or a football game, entitles the broadcaster to copyright protection.1 82 The only authorship or creativity required by the Act is the
simultaneous recording of the event as it is broadcast.
American copyright law began to stray beyond the path of
constitutionality when the 1909 Copyright Act added the exclusive
right to copy to the copyright owner's rights and adopted the work
for hire doctrine. One casualty of these changes was the rational
fair use doctrine promulgated in Folsom, a fair competitive use
doctrine whose proper application turned on the distinction between the use of a work and the use of a work's copyright.
The full effect of these changes did not become apparent until
copyright was applied to new communications technologies. To
understand fully the significance of these changes, one must analyze copyright as a functional rather than doctrinaire legal concept.
Functionally speaking, copyright must accommodate the interests
of three groups: authors, entrepreneurs, and consumers. Thus,
copyright has three different purposes: cultural, economic, and
179.
180.
181.
182.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
Id. § 201(b); id. § 101 (defining "work made for hire").
Id. § 101 (defining "publication" and "perform").
Id. § 101 (defining "fixed").
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social.1s3 These purposes in turn are fulfilled by three functions:
the creative, the distributive, and the learning functions. The legal
doctrines associated with these functions are ownership, control,
and access. The following scheme served as a basis for this
analysis:
Person:
Purpose:
Function:
Doctrine:

Author
Cultural
Creative
Ownership

Entrepreneur
Economic
Distributive
Control

Consumer
Social
Learning
Access

If we apply this scheme to printed materials-the paradigm of
copyright-we will derive the following results for traditional copyright doctrines: (1) the author contributes to the culture of society
by creating works, which he owns; (2) the entrepreneur fulfills the
economic purpose of copyright (and thereby rewards the author)
by distributing the work, a process that he controls; and (3) the
consumer fulfills the social purpose of copyright by using the work
for learning, a use that requires uninhibited access to the work.
As long as copyright was limited to printed materials, the creative, distributive, and learning functions of copyright were discrete, yet reciprocal and interdependent in nature, involving a quid
pro quo at every stage. The author created the work and assigned
the copyright to the entrepreneur in return for royalties. The entrepreneur then distributed the work in fixed form for profit, from
which he paid royalties to the author. The consumer paid the price
of the tangible object in which the work was embodied and received permanent access to the work. Generally, one could say that
the author "owned" the work by reason of his creative efforts; the
entrepreneur "controlled" the copyright of the work through assignment from the author for purposes of distribution; and the
consumer gained uncontrolled access to the work by purchasing a
183.
In a wider perspective, a number of basic dimensions of the nature and function of
copyright may be distinguished. In an overall cultural perspective, the stated purpose
of copyright is to encourage intellectual creation by serving as the main means of recompensing the intellectual worker and to protect his moral rights. In an economic
sense, copyright can be seen as a method for the regulation of trade and commerce.
Copyright thus serves as a mechanism by which the law brings the world of science, art
and culture into relation with the world of commerce. In a social sense, copyright is an
instrument for the cultural, scientific and technological organization of society. Copyright is thus used as a means to channel and control flows of information in society.
E. PLOWMAN & L. HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
25 (1980).
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"copy" of the work.
When the 1909 Act gave the copyright owner the exclusive
right to copy, the scheme, as it concerned the entrepreneur and
consumer, was skewed. Both the entrepreneur and the consumer
now wanted to copy the work, but for different purposes. Because
"to copy" is a generic term, however, the significance of this point
was not recognized. Instead, some reasoned that if the copyright
owner had the exclusive right to copy, the copyright must have
been his property. Copyright, therefore, must have been property,
not regulation. Consequently, the entrepreneur's right to copy for
economic purposes was given preference over the consumer's right
to copy for learning purposes. By contrast, Congress' adoption of
the work for hire doctrine skewed the copyright scheme as it concerned the author and the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur was
given the role of author and, as such, controlled both the creative
and distributive functions of copyright.
The cumulative effect of these developments was to give the
entrepreneur complete control over the three functions of copyright and, therefore, to subordinate copyright's purpose to its function. The victim of these developments was the right of public access. The consequences, however, were more detrimental in theory
than in practice. As long as copyright was limited to printed
materials, the product and the process of communication remained
distinct. Economic concerns limited the right to control distribution. The author still had to write the book, and the entrepreneur
still had to distribute it to gain any profit.
The theoretical detriment, however, became a detriment in
fact when Congress applied these same principles of copyright to
electronic communication in the 1976 Copyright Act. The scenario
presaged by the 1909 Act thus emerged full blown from the 1976
Act. The 1909 Act, by creating the work for hire doctrine, destroyed the reciprocity of the creative and distributive functions of
copyright. The 1976 Act, by conferring copyright from the moment
of fixation and eliminating publication as a condition of copyright,
destroyed the reciprocity of the distributive and learning functions
of copyright. By applying copyright law to new communications
technology, Congress gave the entrepreneur control over all copyright's functions, a result contrary to copyright's constitutional
purpose.
1 84
Pacific and Southern Co. v. Duncan,
an Eleventh Circuit
184.

744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1867 (1984). Although the
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Court of Appeals case of first impression, provides a concrete example of the problem. Duncan, which involved the copyright of
live television newscasts, held that videotaping newscasts off-theair and selling videoclips to subjects of the newscasts is not a fair
use. The court reached this conclusion despite the facts that the
television station systematically erased its videotapes of the newscasts seven days after they were broadcast and did not, by its own
admission, suffer economic harm from the questioned practice or
customarily register its claim of copyright on the newscasts.' 8 5
Duncan, because it involved the application of copyright to a
"new" technology, provides a good example of how copyright law
has been distorted. The copyrighted work, a live television
newscast, was performed for public access for ninety minutes. The
videotape of the copyrighted work was erased seven days later. Yet
a broadcast monitor who taped the newscast off-the-air and sold a
two minute videoclip of the newscast to the subject of the clip was
denied the fair use defense and held to have infringed the station's
copyright. The case thus demonstrates how coalescing copyright's
creative and distributive functions in the entrepreneur, on the one
hand, and substituting performance for the distributive function,
on the other, give the copyright owner complete control of the
learning function by giving him control of access to the copyrighted work.
The relief ordered in Duncan was a permanent injunction
against the defendant's activities. The effect of this injunction was
to give the television station protection for its live television newscasts, the videotapes of which were never registered with the Copyright Office, but instead were erased systematically. The television
station, contrary to the copyright clause, receives perpetual copyright protection for ephemeral works. This result is a variation of
what Professor Paul Goldstein aptly has termed "enterprise monopoly." Professor Goldstein distinguished "enterprise monopoly"
from the statutory copyright as follows:
Enterprise monopolies . . . are built on pyramids of individual copyrights
Statutory copyright's constraint is direct: it empowers its holder to reg....
ulate the timing-and, to a large extent, the pricing-of the public's access to
the individually copyrighted work. Enterprise constraint is more subtle. Not
only does the enterprise have the capacity to regulhte the timing and pricing
of public access to its inventory of works, it also has a degree of control,
author was counsel for defendant in this case, the role of advocate for a private litigant has
been discarded for the purposes of this Article. Criticism of this case is based on a concern
for the law of copyright developed over twenty years of study and teaching in the area.
185. Id.; see also 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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roughly proportional to the size of its copyright aggregation, over the content
and the selection of works which are made available to the public."'

Duncan's result varies from Professor Goldstein's "enterprise
monopoly" because in Duncan the enterprise acquired its monopoly by using one claim of copyright on one small portion of a work
to protect all future works in the same class. The court apparently
was unimpressed that the subject of the works happened to be
news reports, a type of work arguably vested with a public interest
involving free speech considerations. The court's disregard for the
copyright clause indicates the mesmeric effect that the notion of
copyright as property has, at least on courts for whom copyright is
an arcane subject. History is repeating itself. "A copyright enterprise, to the extent that it dominates and regulates a market, exercises a private hegemony which, when joined with the Copyright
Act's license to operate, places the enterprise in a quasi-governmental position approaching that of the Stationers' Company in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.' ' 1 7 The ghost of Millar v.

Taylor has arisen in the form of Duncan to give legitimacy to the
claim of the stationers of the twentieth century that they are entitled to copyright protection in perpetuity.
Despite the two centuries separating the cases, the decisions
are a product of similar circumstances-technology, monopoly, and
the superficial reasoning that characterizes law derived from the
judicial resolution of private disputes. There is, however, one major
difference in the two cultures that produced the cases-the premium placed on the freedom of speech. Reason tells us that a body
of rules that enables communications conglomerates to control the
flow of information and ideas for profit also gives them the power
of censorship. Yet reason has little force of itself, for we are all
culture bound, limited in the power to rationalize by the ideas we
inherit. Thus, because copyright was separated long ago from its
role as governmental censor and has evolved from a monopoly to
be restrained to a private property to be embraced, the framers'
wisdom in formulating the copyright clause is in danger of becoming forfeited, because the framers lived in culture different from
ours-free speech was more important than private property and
public learning more valuable than private profit.
New technology has revived the great question of literary
186. Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L.
(1970).
187.

REV.

983, 986

Id. at 987. The analogy becomes even more apt when one recognizes that televi-

sion stations are licensed by the federal government.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

property. Courts should not ignore the charter for copyright embodied in the copyright clause. The risk is that judges will be beguiled by the talismanic nature of the word property. Already
cases suggest that in the computer field, the proprietary concept of
copyright reigns supreme. 8 ' For example, in Whelan Associates,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 8 ' the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a computer program copyright protects the
structures, sequence, and organization of the program. Such a
copyright arguably protects ideas, not merely the expression of
those ideas, contrary to the mandate of Congress in the Copyright
Act. Moreover, in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central,
Inc. 90 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that West's copyright protected "West's arrangements of cases in its National Reporter System Publications . . . and . . . that the LEXIS Star
Pagination feature infringes West's copyright in the
arrangement.'' 1
In many of the computer cases, it is clear that the court was
impressed with the deceitful and fraudulent conduct of the defendant'19 2 and that the result was merited as a matter of equity.
Courts, however, should not allow rascals to make law for all citizens, both consumers and competitors. Thus, in their zeal to do
justice, courts err by treating copyright as property. If copyright is
property for the purpose of protecting the copyright owner against
piratical competitors, however, it remains property for protecting
the copyright owner against nonpiratical consumers. Because new
communications technology gives a copyright owner control of access without limitation, characterizing copyright as property eliminates, for all practical purposes, the distinction between the use of
the copyright and the use of the work.
The solution to the control of access problem was presaged almost seventy years ago by the Supreme Court in International
News Service v. Associated Press. 9 In INS the Associated Press
(AP) sought to enjoin the International News Service (INS) from
using AP press dispatches. The news reports were copyrightable,
188. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic International,
Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
189. 32 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 384 (1986).
190. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986).
191. Id. at 1220.
192. See, e.g., SAS Institute, Inc., v. S & H Computer Systems, 605 F. Supp. 816
(M.D. Tenn. 1985).
193. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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but not copyrighted. The case, therefore, can be viewed as a copyright case in the guise of unfair competition. The Court bypassed
"the general question of property in news matter at common law,
or the application of the copyright act, since it seems to us that the
case must turn upon the question of unfair competition in business." 194 The Court then disposed of INS's argument that by distributing its news reports, AP no longer had the right to control
their use because the reports, once distributed, became available
for use by anyone for any purpose. The Court stated: "The fault in
the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the complainant
as against the public, instead of considering the rights of complainant and defendant, competitors in business, as between
themselves."19 5
Because the Court was concerned that INS was endeavoring
"to reap where it has not sown,"'196 it characterized the news reports as "quasi property for the purposes of their business because
they are both selling it as such.' 97 By characterizing copyright as
quasi-property, the Court, faced with an uncopyrighted work, was
really saying that copyright is a regulatory concept because the
real subject of copyright is not the work, but the use of the work.
In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.'9 8 Justice
Holmes made this point as follows:
The notion of property starts . . . from confirmed possession of a tangible
object and consists in the right to exclude others from interference with the
more or less free doing with it as one wills. But in copyright property has
reached a more abstract expression. The right to exclude is not directed to an
object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo, so to speak. ... It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the party having
the right."99

Like INS, modern cases involving copyrights for computer
programs have emphasized the defendant's conduct. 00 Unlike
INS, however, these contemporary rulings have been based on the
copyright statute and thus apply to the consumer, as well as the
competitor, because the question is deemed to involve property,
not quasi-property. If courts would recognize copyright as quasi194. Id. at 234-35.
195. Id. at 239.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 242.
198. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
199. Id. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring).
200. See, e.g., SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Systems, 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985).
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property, they also would recognize it as being regulatory in nature. Courts, however, appear unwilling to take this step without
strong reason for doing so. Consequently, we must return to the
copyright clause itself and to the argument that because of free
speech concerns that clause limits Congress' power to enact copyright legislation.
The Constitution creates no property rights. 20 1 Furthermore,
Congress, by enacting a copyright statute, does not create any either. The statute merely creates rights and commensurate duties
to which a particular type of property-an author's writings-may
or may not be subjected at the author's will. If the author chooses
to utilize the rights, he also assumes the duties. Foremost among
those duties is the duty to provide public access to the work, for
without access no learning can occur.
Thus, the time has come to make explicit the doctrine that
American courts in the nineteenth century practiced, but did not
preach-that a distinction exists between the work and the copyright of a work. This distinction reflects the essence of copyright as
a regulatory rather than proprietary concept. As the Supreme
Court has noted:
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
"author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. "The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly," this Court
has said, 2"lie
in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
02
authors.

Courts have ignored the conclusion that flows from this analysis of copyright-that copyright's purpose is primarily to serve the
public-by treating copyright as a proprietary concept. Part of the
reason for this result is that courts make law for the parties, not
the public. Although copyright may be viewed as property between
parties who are competitors, it really is quasi-property. Quasiproperty rights against competitors, as INS makes clear, do not
necessarily extend equally to the public. Copyright, in short, regulates the economic use of a work by a competitor, and the proper
application of copyright law requires courts to make the distinction between the use of the work and the use of the copyright of
the work. The important point to remember is that the use of the
work and the use of the copyright are not reflexive. Using the
201. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
202. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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copyright necessarily entails using the work, but using the work
does not necessarily entail using the copyright.
The distinction between the use of the work and the use of the
copyright is the key to establishing a rational fair use doctrine and
protecting free speech rights. The competitor uses the copyright;
the consumer uses the work. The copyright owner, by reason of the
Copyright Act and the copyright clause, has not only no right to
interfere, but a duty not to interfere with the consumer's use of a
publicly disseminated work.
The problem posed by characterizing copyright as a proprietary concept reaches beyond free speech concerns. The ultimate
question is whether copyright law should be an integrated body of
coherent rules serving the interests of three groups-the author,
the entrepreneur, and the consumer-or whether it should be a
body of disparate rules serving primarily the interest of the entrepreneur. Remember, copyright's three dimensions-the creative,
the economic, and the social-are congruent only in gross. Their
compatability in delineation and implementation requires compromise. Copyright, in short, must be recognized for what it is: a tripartite legal concept that entails imposing concessions in the form
of constraints upon each constituent group that the concept serves.
The fundamental problem of copyright law is how to determine
the measure of the constraints. The starting point for making this
determination must be a sound predicate. Unless courts agree either that copyright is proprietary or that it is regulatory in nature,
the confusion of copyright law will continue, because this dual conceptual basis has led to the confused state of copyright law today.
The copyright clause and traditional copyright doctrine dictate
which concept is chosen.
The 1976 Copyright Act itself is predicated on the regulatory
concept of copyright. The Act limits and precisely defines the
scope of the rights it confers;20 3 it limits the term of the rights it
defines; and it places the work into the public domain at the expiration of the copyright term. 0 4 Although the statute treats copy203.

Dowling v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 3127, 3133 (1985) ("the copyright holder's

dominion is subjected to precisely defined limits").
204.

Consider also the following regulatory aspects of the Copyright Act. The copy-

right may be lost if the terms of the statute are not complied with, for example, if publication is not accompanied by notice. 17 U.S.C. § 401. Once lost, a copyright cannot be recap-

tured. The copyrighted work is subject to a fair use. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Some copyrights are
more limited than others, for example, the copyright of sound recordings, 17 U.S.C. § 114,
and compilations or derivative works, 17 U.S.C. § 103. The first sale of a copy of a copy-

righted work exhausts the right of the copyright owner to vend that copy. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
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right as regulation, the fate of copyright is not solely in the hands
of Congress. Copyright's destiny also is determined by the courts.
The courts, as opposed to Congress, view copyright as proprietary
in nature and have interpreted the statute accordingly. 0 5 Interpretation of regulation requires one set of principles; interpretation of
property requires another. The courts' application of property
principles to regulation creates confusion, because the legislative
lawmaker and the judicial lawmaker are serving conflicting purposes. This conflict exists in part because of the differences in the
two processes: the legislature serves the public interest by considering its actions' general consequences for all citizens; the court
serves the public interest by considering its ruling's particular consequences for the parties before the court. A court's view of copyright, therefore, is constricted by the shape of the controversy
before it, and the controversy before it usually is one in which the
defendant has acted contrary to the sacred principles of property.
Saying that copyright is regulation is tantamount to recognizing that copyright law is in fact a statutory unfair competition doctrine, a view that has sound historical and, as INS demonstrates,
contemporary precedent. The belief that a competitor has no right
"to reap where he has not sown" is the essence of copyright. Protecting the harvest, however, can extend constitutionally only to
the economic rewards provided by the marketplace. Copyright cannot extend constitutionally to the harvest of learning, nor can it be
used to tax the consumer for gleaning the fields after the harvest.
Copyright can protect only the owner's right to profit as the market provides; it cannot be used to create a profit by creating a new
market. Copyright protects the owner against unfair use by competitors, not ordinary use by consumers. That is why the distinction between the use of the copyright and the use of the work is
critical. A coherent theory of copyright requires recognition of this
distinction, and the copyright clause commands this distinction for
Certain copyrighted works are subject to a compulsory license, either because of the work's

nature (musical compositions, 17 U.S.C. § 115), the form the work takes (records for jukeboxes, 17 U.S.C. § 116), or its use (cable television, 17 U.S.C. § 111, or public broadcasting,
17 U.S.C. § 118). The sale of the tangible object in which the work is embodied does not
constitute a sale of the copyright and vice versa. 17 U.S.C. § 202. The work's author has an
inalienable right to terminate the assignment of the copyright between thirty-five and forty
years after the assignment. 17 U.S.C. § 203. Finally, copyright protects only the expression of

the idea, not the idea itself. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
205. The Fifth Circuit made this point succinctly: "The first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property." Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979).
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the protection of free speech rights.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If the copyright clause has any meaning, the 1976 Copyright
Act comes perilously close to being unconstitutional. The stated
constitutional purpose of copyright is to promote learning. To fulfill that purpose, copyright functions to protect the author's right
to his writings. Construing the copyright clause in light of the state
of copyright law in 1787, which reflected the Statute of Anne and
Donaldson v. Beckett,10 one reasonably can infer that the clause
limits Congress to providing copyright for works that are not only
fixed, but also distributed in order to insure public access. The essence of copyright always has been the right to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies for sale. A constitutional copyright promotes learning.
The 1976 Copyright Act provides statutory copyright from the
moment of fixation, but does not require that the work be disseminated to the public as a condition of copyright protection. Because
public dissemination is not necessary for copyright, the copyright
owner may determine not only whether to disseminate, but on
what terms to disseminate the work publicly. The statute, therefore, provides the basis for changing the essence of copyright from
the right to reproduce the work in copies for sale to the right to
control the public access to the copyrighted work for any reason or
no reason. A statutory copyright that gives the copyright owner
complete control of public access to the work following its publication has no constitutional basis.
The presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes
tips the balance in favor of the Copyright Act's constitutionality.
The presumption, however, presumes that a statute that reaches or
possibly goes beyond the boundaries of constitutionality will be
given a constitutional construction. Here lies the danger. As
Duncan20 7 illustrates, constitutionally questionable provisions of
the Copyright Act can be given a reasonable construction that
sanctions unconstitutional copyrights.
Congress, in providing copyright for live television broadcasts,
imposed certain compensatory requirements on the copyright
206. 4 Burr. 2407, 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 17 Corbett's Parl. Hist. Eng. 953 (H.L. 1774).
207.

Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.

Ct. 1867 (1984).
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claimant-fixation of the work 20 8 and registration as a prerequisite
to an infringement action.20 9 Yet in Duncan the court held that the
work did not have to be fixed for any specific duration and, ignoring the registration requirement, ordered a permanent injunction
to provide copyright protection for works that had not yet been
created and that would be destroyed shortly after they were created and the copyright proprietor had obtained his profit. Had the
court interpreted the statute in light of the copyright clause, it
would have recognized that fixation is a constitutional requirement
that must be treated as something more than a fiction and that the
registration requirement's purpose is to compensate for dispensing
with the requirement of publication. By ignoring the copyright
clause, the court created a judicial copyright of perpetual duration
unencumbered by constitutional limitations.
The Eleventh Circuit's fallacy in Duncan-that a copyright
claimed under the copyright statute is a fortiori constitutional-suggests that courts do not deem the copyright clause relevant to the interpretation of the Copyright Act. The fallacy is supported by the Act's own reliance on legal fictions-fictions
regarding authors, writings, creativity, and publication. The presence of these fictions, however, accentuates the need to resort to
the copyright clause when interpreting the statute. Thus, the copyright clause, interpreted in light of its historical sources, justifies
the notion that copyright is a regulatory rather than proprietary
concept; requires the distinction between the use of the copyright
and the use of the work; compels the interpretation of the fair use
doctrine as a fair competitive use doctrine; and informs us that the
clause incorporates free speech values.
Suprisingly, these ideas often are reflected in what courts do,
but not in what they say. Two recent Supreme Court decisions on
210
fair use, Sony Corporationof America v. Universal City Studios
and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,1
demonstrate my point. In Sony the copyright's subject matter was
the product of new technology, motion pictures broadcast over the
public airwaves. The fundamental issue was whether the copyright
owner had the right to control individual access to material that
had been disseminated publicly only within a short and rigid time
frame and thereby to limit public access. The Supreme Court held
208.
209.
210.
211.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
Id. § 411.
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
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that the copyright owner did not have this power.2 12 Its decision
portrays copyright as a regulatory concept, utilizes the distinction
between the use of the copyright and the use of the work, treats
the fair use doctrine as a fair competitive use doctrine, and implicitly acknowledges that the copyright clause incorporates free
speech values. By taping copyrighted programs off-the-air for personal in-home use, the individual makes use of the work, not of the
copyright.
Harper & Row 2 13 involved the right of public access to a
book-the paradigm of traditional copyright. Without articulating
the point, the Court used the distinction between the use of the
copyright and the use of the work. The defendant was a competitor
who used the copyright, not the work. It claimed the right to use
the copyright under the banner of fair use and free speech. The
defendant's argument was hollow, however, because the issue was
not the author's duty to provide public access, but his right to provide first public access. No public benefit would have been realized
by permitting the competitor to preempt the copyright owner's
right to provide this access.2 14
Sony and Harper& Row are more sound in their results than
in their reasoning. The split decisions in both cases indicate that
the results were achieved more by intuition than by an understanding of sound copyright principles. These intuitive decisions
have not been enough to guide the lower courts. For example,
Duncan, which treated copyright as a proprietary concept, ignored
the distinction between the use of the copyright and the use of the
212.
213.

464 U.S. at 442-56.
105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).

214. The work in Harper & Row was unpublished. Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act,
therefore, the defendant would not have needed to resort to the fair use doctrine because an
unpublished work was not copyrightable. The 1976 Act, however, provided statutory copyright from the moment of fixation. The concept of fair use should relate only to the use of
the copyright. Without a copyright, the issue could have been resolved on the basis of the
theft of property. Ironically, Harper& Row and the 1976 Act hurt the author by providing a

basis for applying the fair use doctrine to unpublished works. "Though the right of first
publication, like the other rights enumerated in § 106 is expressly made subject to the fair
use provisions of § 107, fair use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case." 105

S. Ct. at 2227. The conflation of the common-law copyright with the statutory copyright,
similar to Millar's conflation of the author's right and the publishers' rights, therefore, ben-

efits the entrepreneur rather than the author.
A problem here, however, is the retention of the fiction that the public performance of a
work does not constitute publication, a doctrine that can be traced to the eighteenth century and predicated on copyright for printed material. Macklin v. Richardson, 2 Amb. 694,
27 Eng. Rep. 451 (1770); see also Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912). In an age of

electronic communication, the solution is to define public dissemination as publication.
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work, rejected the fair competitive use doctrine, and ignored the
free speech constraints on Congress' power to enact copyright
legislation.
The issues implicated by copyright and fair use mirror those
implicated by the free speech clause. Those issues are fundamental
in our society and merit better intellectual treatment than they
have received. If the pen is mightier than the sword, making the
pen a monopoly of entrepreneurs who disseminate ideas threatens
the very foundation of our free society. The framers of the Constitution, by incorporating free speech doctrines in the copyright
clause, acted with an infinite wisdom that will serve us well if we
are wise enough to accept their teaching. Anglo-American copyright's origins in monopoly and censorship contain a lesson that we
ignore at our own peril.

